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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the federal circuit courts of appeals have divided in 
addressing to what extent either Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
19641 (hereinafter “Title VI”) or Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 19722 (hereinafter “Title IX”) protects those who 
complain about racial or gender discrimination from retaliation by 
their employers or schools.3  Title VI prohibits federal agencies from 
providing funding to any person, organization, or governmental 
agency that discriminates on the basis of race.4  Similarly, Title IX 
 
 ∗ James B. Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.  J.D., 1987, Yale 
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 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-4a (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).  Title IX provides that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  Id. § 1681(a); see Derek 
Black, Comment, Picking up the Pieces After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private 
Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356, 377 n.148 (2002). 
 3 Compare Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff 
can sue for retaliation under Title VI), with Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 
F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under 
Title IX), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004).  See Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1672, 2003 WL 
22428035 (S. Ct. May 13, 2003) [hereinafter “Cert. Petition”] (arguing that there is a 
split in circuits requiring Supreme Court review of Jackson); infra notes 16-27 and 
accompanying text, and Part IV. 
 4 Section 601 of the statute provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see generally 
Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND 
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 23-25 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 
1999); James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice 
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 152-55 (1994).  
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prohibits gender discrimination in federally funded educational 
programs and activities.  Title IX “was modeled after Title VI . . . 
which is parallel to Title IX except that it prohibits race 
discrimination, not sex discrimination, and applies in all programs 
receiving federal funds, not only in education programs.”5  Because 
of the similarities between these two statutes, federal courts have 
often examined them together when interpreting their respective 
meanings.6 
Neither Title VI nor Title IX explicitly provides for a private 
right of action,7 but courts have interpreted both statutes to authorize 
private suits for plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination.8  In 
 
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which is limited to government actors, Title VI 
reaches private actors who are recipients of federal funds.  Pamela S. Karlen, 
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 196 n.83 (2003).  In its 
Title VI Manual, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provides helpful definitions of 
the terms “recipient” and “beneficiary.”  A recipient receives grants or funding from 
a federal funding agency.  The recipient usually is a state or local government agency 
that serves as an intermediary for receiving monies from the federal government that 
it then ultimately provides to individual beneficiaries.  See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 20-28 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf [hereinafter “Title VI Manual”]; 
Jonathan M.H. Short, “Something of a Sport:” The Effect of Sandoval on Title IX Disparate 
Impact Discrimination Suits, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 119, 119 n.5 (2002); Colopy, 
supra, at 154; The ultimate individual beneficiaries are exempt from Title VI.  See id. 
 5 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998); Cannon v. 
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979) (stating that Title IX was modeled 
after Title VI); Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 
1015 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational 
Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1987) (same); Chowdbury v. Reading Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts have consistently held the 
[Title IX] language of Cannon to be applicable in discussions of Title VI.”); 118 
CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Black, supra note 2, at 377 n.151, 
381 n.184; Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57 nn.140-41; Bradford C. Mank, Is There a 
Private Cause of Action Under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 28-29 
(1999) (discussing Cannon’s explicit reliance on Title VI cases to interpret Title IX) 
[hereinafter Mank, Private Cause]; Short, supra note 4, at 119-20 (observing that Title 
IX and Title VI share many similarities, but some differences as well); see also 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (using Title IX case, Cannon, to 
interpret Title VI); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984) (stating that the 
congressional intent behind Title VI and Title IX was the same); infra notes 10, 75-
81, 112, 121-26, 249 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 10, 75-81, 89-90, 112, 121-26, 128-30, 139, 249 and accompanying 
text. 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88; Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: 
Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551, 554 (2003). 
 8 See, e.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 (recognizing that Title VI provides private 
right of action for intentional discrimination); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288-92 (stating that, 
in Title IX cases, monetary damages are appropriate under either Title VI or Title IX 
where recipient of federal funding has knowledge of intentional discrimination by 
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Cannon v. University of Chicago,9 the United States Supreme Court 
stated that “[w]e have no doubt that Congress intended to create 
Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and 
that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of 
action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.”10  However, in 
Alexander v. Sandoval,11 the Supreme Court in 2001 held that there is 
no implied private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations 
prohibiting recipients from engaging in disparate impact 
discrimination.12 
An important question left unanswered by Sandoval is whether a 
plaintiff may bring a private lawsuit alleging that he or she is the 
victim of retaliation for complaining about discrimination under 
Title VI or Title IX.  It is now common for employees or students 
filing Title VI or Title IX suits to allege that their employers or 
schools have retaliated against them for complaining of 
discrimination.13  Neither Title VI nor Title IX explicitly prohibits 
retaliation by recipients of federal funds.14  However, various federal 
agencies have issued specific Title VI or Title IX regulations that 
explicitly prohibit retaliation by recipients.15 
 
employee, but fails to correct problem); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 
U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (stating that compensatory damages are appropriate in Title IX 
private right of action where school district has knowledge that teacher is engaging 
in sexual harassment, but fails to take action); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (opinion of White, J.) (stating that private 
damages are available where recipient has notice it is engaging in intentional 
discrimination); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 315 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 
Title VI provides private right of action for intentional discrimination); Horner v. Ky. 
High Sch. Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 689-93 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Supreme 
Court’s Title VI and Title IX cases agree that plaintiff must establish intentional 
discrimination to receive compensatory damages). 
 9 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 10 Id. at 703 (holding that a private right of action exists under Title IX and 
suggesting that one might also exist with respect to Title VI because Congress 
modeled Title IX after Title VI). 
 11 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 12 Id. at 280-91. 
 13 See, e.g., Peters, 327 F.3d 307; Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 
1333 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004); Lowrey v. Tex. 
A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. 
Supp. 2d 579, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2001); Heckman, supra note 7, at 595-610 (discussing 
Title IX retaliation cases) & n.314 (listing Title IX retaliation cases); infra notes 295, 
316-17, 331-35, 339, 366-72 and accompanying text. 
 14 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1344. 
 15 For example, the Department of Education’s regulations under Title VI 
provide: 
Intimidatory or retaliatory acts prohibited.  No recipient or other 
person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any 
individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege 
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The federal circuit courts of appeals have recently divided 
regarding whether a private right of action for retaliation exists 
under either Title VI or Title IX.16  In 2003, in Peters v. Jenney,17 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
absence of an explicit prohibition against retaliation in Title VI does 
not “lead to an inference that Congress did not mean to prohibit 
retaliation in § 601” because “relevant precedent interpreting 
similarly worded antidiscrimination statutes” construed 
“discrimination” to include “retaliation.”18  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,19 held that if a statute is silent or ambiguous about the 
particular issue in question courts should defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of that statute if it is issued as part of a valid 
rule, because it is presumed that Congress delegated interpretive 
power to an agency with the authority to issue rules having the “force 
of law.”20  Pursuant to Chevron, the Peters court deferred to the 
 
secured by section 601 of the Act or this part, or because he has made a 
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part.  The identity of 
complainants shall be kept confidential except to the extent necessary 
to carry out the purposes of this part, including the conduct of any 
investigation, hearing, or judicial proceeding arising thereunder. 
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004); see 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (2004) (Department of Education 
Title IX regulation); 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(e) (2004) (Department of Justice Title VI 
regulation); see also Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 
(4th Cir. 1994) (discussing Department of Education regulation 34 C.F.R. § 100.7); 
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“The 
Fourth Circuit has recognized that the prohibition against retaliation is a product of 
a regulation, not contained in the statute itself.”) (citing Preston, 31 F.3d 203); Nelson 
v. Univ. of Maine, 923 F. Supp. 275, 278-79 (D. Me. 1996) (“In the context of 
retaliatory discrimination, at issue in this case, Title IX protects employees who 
either participate in a Title IX investigation, or who oppose unlawful employment 
practices prohibited by Title IX.”). 
 16 Compare Peters, 327 F.3d 307 (holding that a plaintiff can sue for retaliation 
under Title VI), with Jackson, 309 F.3d 1333 (holding that a claim for retaliation does 
not lie under Title IX); see Brianne J. Gorod, Case Comment, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: 
Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights of Action; Peters v. Jenney, 
327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 309 F.3d 
1333 (11th Cir. 2002), Petition for Cert. Filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. May 13, 2003) 
(NO. 02-1672), 113 YALE L.J. 939 (2004). 
 17 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 18 Id. at 316-19. 
 19 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 20 See id. at 842-43 (stating courts should defer to agency’s interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory language if interpretation is reasonable), 865-66 (stressing that 
executive agencies have more appropriate role in defining ambiguous statutory 
language because they possess greater substantive expertise than courts, and agencies 
are politically accountable through elections, unlike courts); see also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221-30 (2001) (explaining that Chevron doctrine requires 
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Department of Education’s anti-retaliation provision (34 C.F.R. § 
100.7(e)) as an indication of how to interpret the statute.21  In light of 
Sandoval’s holding that Congress intended Title VI to prohibit only 
intentional discrimination, the Peters decision recognized a private 
cause of action only for those who allege that a recipient retaliated 
against them for complaining about intentional discrimination.22  It 
did not recognize a private right of action for retaliation by those 
complaining that a recipient had engaged in practices causing 
disparate impacts that are forbidden by various agency regulations.23 
By contrast, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,24 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2002 
rejected any private right of action against retaliation because the text 
of § 901 of Title IX does not explicitly provide for such a private 
cause of action for retaliation.25  Assuming arguendo that a private 
right of action existed to sue recipients for retaliation, the Eleventh 
Circuit observed that it would limit any such right to plaintiffs who 
are the victims of gender discrimination and would not allow those 
who merely allege that others have suffered gender discrimination, 
such as the male plaintiff in that case, to pursue a retaliation claim.26  
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the text of § 901 only identifies 
victims of gender discrimination as the class it aims to benefit, but the 
court did not believe that the text of the statute even went that far.27 
The Jackson decision relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2001 
Sandoval decision.28  In concluding that there was no implied private 
 
courts to defer to agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statute or fill 
“gap” in a silent statute where Congress has delegated to agency authority to issue 
regulations carrying “force of law”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26 
(1996) (describing presumption established in Chevron that silence in statute shows 
intent of Congress to leave act of interpretation in hands of agency in charge of 
administering act); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 833-34 & passim (2001) (explaining that Chevron fundamentally 
expanded deference of courts to agency interpretations of statutes by presuming 
gaps or ambiguities in statute reflected implicit congressional intent to delegate 
interpretive authority to agency); infra notes 315, 333, 354-58 and accompanying 
text.  Conversely, if a statute’s language is clear and specific, a court must reject an 
agency interpretation that is contrary to that language.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 21 See Peters, 327 F.3d at 315-16, 318-19. 
 22 See id. at 319 & n.11. 
 23 See id. 
 24 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (June 14, 2004). 
 25 Id. at 1346. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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right of action to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations,29 the 
Jackson court followed dicta in Sandoval suggesting that only express 
statutory language may establish a private right of action.30  However, 
to the extent that the Sandoval decision suggested in dicta that rights 
of action must be express, its reasoning is contrary to the Court’s 
precedent and prior reasoning.31  The Sandoval decision itself 
acknowledged that “regulations applying § 601’s ban on intentional 
discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that 
section.”32  For example, the Court has recognized a cause of action 
under Title IX for sexual harassment, even though the statute does 
not explicitly prohibit such conduct, because such suits are consistent 
with the statute’s core prohibition against intentional sex 
discrimination.33  Additionally, the Court has held that under Title IX 
a student may sue school officials for deliberate indifference 
concerning her complaints of sexual harassment by other students 
even though the statute contains no explicit provision authorizing 
such a private right of action.34 
This Article argues that both Title VI and Title IX implicitly 
authorize plaintiffs to file retaliation claims against recipients of 
federal funds.  Since the 1969 decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, Inc.,35 the Supreme Court has consistently recognized retaliation 
claims as vindicating the central antidiscrimination principles of 
comparable civil rights statutes, and therefore, such suits are 
permissible even after Sandoval.36  Retaliation claims are rooted in 
both Title VI’s and Title IX’s central purpose of prohibiting 
 
 29 See id. at 280-87. 
 30 Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1341 (stating that Sandoval Court relied “exclusively on the 
text and structure of Title VI” in determining that “Title VI implies no private right 
to sue for actions not motivated by discriminatory intent that result in a disparate 
impact.”) (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293). 
 31 See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern 
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 244 (2003) (arguing 
that Sandoval implies private right of action must be based on explicit statutory 
language, but contending that view is contrary to precedent). 
 32 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284; see also Peters, 327 F.3d at 315 (citing Sandoval); infra 
notes 189, 212-14 and accompanying text. 
 33 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); Black, supra note 2, at 362-
63 (discussing Davis and Gebser). 
 34 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-49; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. 
 35 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
 36 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 13-15; infra notes 240-45 
and accompanying text. 
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intentional discrimination.37  Additionally, following the Chevron 
doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Peters appropriately deferred to agency 
regulations interpreting Title VI and Title IX to prohibit retaliation.38  
Although holding that Title VI regulations could not authorize a 
private right of action to enforce regulations prohibiting disparate 
impact discrimination,39 the Sandoval Court recognized that these 
agency regulations were effective to the extent they vindicated Title 
VI’s core prohibition against intentional discrimination.40  Thus, 
courts may conclude that Title VI and Title IX implicitly allow 
plaintiffs to bring retaliation claims if their employer or school 
retaliates against them for complaining about intentional racial or 
gender discrimination, because such suits are strongly consistent with 
the statutes primary purpose of prohibiting recipients from engaging 
in intentional discrimination.41 
Part I of this Article summarizes Title VI and Title IX.  Part II 
discusses the Supreme Court’s initially broad implication of private 
rights of action for both statutes, and the Court’s subsequent 
limitation of such suits.  Part III examines the Supreme Court’s 
inference of anti-retaliation principles in various civil statutes, and 
whether the existence of an explicit anti-retaliation provision in Title 
VII weighs against inferring an implicit right against retaliation under 
Title VI and Title IX.  Part IV then discusses the split between the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits regarding whether Title VI and Title IX 
imply a private right of action for retaliation.  The Article concludes 
in Part V that courts should find that Title VI and Title IX establish 
an implied private right of action for retaliation because such suits 
serve both statutes’ shared core prohibition against intentional 
discrimination. 
I.  TITLE VI AND TITLE IX 
A. Introduction to Title VI 
Section 601 of Title VI states that “[n]o person shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
 
 37 See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.3. 
 38 See Peters, 327 F.3d at 316-21, 323-24. 
 39 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 189, 212-13 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra text accompanying notes 334-40, 360-63, 404, 409-10. 
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financial assistance.”42  The statute does not specify whether the term 
“discrimination” prohibits only intentional discrimination or also 
reaches unintentional, disparate impact discrimination.43  The 
statute’s legislative history contains statements supporting both 
interpretations.44  In 1974, in Lau v. Nichols,45 the Supreme Court at 
least implied and arguably held that both § 601 and § 602 of Title VI 
prohibited disparate impact discrimination, stating that 
“[d]iscrimination is barred which has that effect even though no 
purposeful design is present.”46  However, since the 1978 decision of 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke,47 the Court has consistently 
interpreted § 601 to forbid only intentional discrimination by 
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, but not to 
prohibit disparate impact discrimination.48 
The Supreme Court has recognized that private plaintiffs may 
file a private right of action under § 601 of Title VI alleging that a 
recipient has committed intentional discrimination.49  Congress has 
 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 23-25; supra note 4 and 
infra notes 43-48, 159, 161, 168-73, 176, 195, 212-13 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) 
(“The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the word ‘discrimination’ is 
inherently so.”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he term ‘discrimination’ as used in Title VI is, of course, notoriously 
ambiguous, generating more than thirty years of litigation over its precise 
meaning.”); Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for 
Defining “Discrimination,” 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 21-23, 25-27 (1981) (arguing that 1964 
legislative history of Title VI suggests Congress did not precisely define term 
“discrimination,” and instead left difficult question of defining discrimination to 
executive branch); Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 517 (2002) (observing that term “discrimination” in Title VI is 
ambiguous); [hereinafter Mank, Title VI Regulations]; Michael Mello, Defunding Death, 
32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 959 (1995) (same); Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 
31, at 221 (same); David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake 
of Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 92-98 (2004) (same). 
 44 See Abernathy, supra note 43, at 21-23, 25-27; Mello, supra note 43, at 959. 
 45 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 46 Id. at 568; see Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 521-22. 
 47 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 48 See id. at 287 (Section 601 “proscribes only those racial classifications that 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment”) (opinion of 
Powell, J.); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-82; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11; Karlen, 
supra note 4, at 196; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 23-25.  But see Abernathy, supra 
note 43, at 21-23, 25-27 (arguing that 1964 legislative history of Title VI suggests 
Congress left difficult question of defining discrimination to executive branch); 
Mello, supra note 43, at 959 (same). 
 49 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280 (stating that it is “beyond dispute that private 
individuals may sue to enforce” § 601’s prohibition against intentional 
discrimination); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (holding private right of action exists under 
Title IX and suggesting that private right of action also exists with respect to Title VI 
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implicitly recognized such private suits by abrogating state sovereign 
immunity against Title VI suits, which would not be necessary if the 
United States was the only possible plaintiff.50  Furthermore, Congress 
has explicitly authorized attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs in 
Title VI cases.51 
Additionally, § 602 of Title VI “authorize[s] and direct[s]” 
federal funding agencies to “effectuate the provisions of section 601” 
by issuing and enforcing “rules, regulations or orders of general 
applicability” that prohibit recipients from engaging in 
discrimination and that establish a process for investigating and 
assessing complaints of racial discrimination filed with the agency.52  
Section 602 also requires those regulations to be approved by the 
President, who has delegated that authority to the Attorney General.53  
In 1964, a presidential task force developed standard Title VI 
 
because Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196; 
Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 31-32; Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and 
Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1776 (2003). 
 50 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196. 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1(2000 & Supp. I 2001); see Colopy, supra note 4, at 155; 
Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 12; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25; 
Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 221; Note, supra note 49, at 1776. 
 53 Section 602 of Title VI states in part: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend 
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, 
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is 
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of 
this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent 
with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the 
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.  No 
such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until 
approved by the President. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 12; Mank, Title VI, supra 
note 4, at 25.  To facilitate the enforcement of the various § 602 regulations issued by 
various agencies, the DOJ has issued regulations concerning the implementation of 
Title VI requirements, including a requirement that agencies adopt procedures for 
monitoring a recipient’s pre- and post-award compliance.  See 28 C.F.R. § 42.405 
(2004) (DOJ Regulations); 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.110 & 7.115 (2004) (EPA regulations); 
Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 313 (1995); Mello, supra note 43, at 961 n.143.  If it finds a 
recipient has engaged in discriminatory actions, an agency may refuse to award or 
continue assistance, or refer the matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution.  
See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (2004) (Environmental Protection Agency regulations); Fisher, 
supra, at 313; Colopy, supra note 4, at 176-80.  However, if a recipient is found to have 
engaged in discriminatory practices, federal agencies almost always reach a 
settlement with a recipient to prevent such conduct in the future, but continue to 
provide funding.  See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra 
note 4, at 25. 
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regulations prohibiting recipients from using “criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination.”54  Soon thereafter, all cabinet agencies and 
approximately forty federal agencies adopted similar regulations to 
prohibit recipients from engaging in practices having discriminatory 
impacts.55  At least twenty-six agencies currently maintain such 
regulations.56  For example, the Department of Justice (hereinafter 
“DOJ”) has promulgated regulations stating that a recipient of 
federal financial assistance shall neither “directly [n]or through 
contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin,” or 
which “have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects 
individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.”57  Similarly, 
the Department of Education’s Title VI regulations forbid recipients 
to engage in either intentional discrimination or practices causing 
disparate impacts with respect to protected minority groups.58 
Furthermore, the DOJ and many other federal agencies have 
adopted regulations prohibiting retaliation by Title VI recipients 
 
 54 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2004) (emphasis added); see Guardians Ass’n v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also 
Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25; Sidney D. 
Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination—It Shouldn’t Be So 
Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 947-48 (1990) (noting presidential task force in 1964 
helped federal agencies promulgate comparable disparate impact regulations under 
Title VI); Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964CImplementation and Impact, 
36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 846 (1968); Note, supra note 49, at 1776.  The task force 
included representatives from the White House, DOJ, the Civil Rights Commission, 
and Bureau of the Budget.  Comment, supra, at 846 n.19. 
 55 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 592 n.13 (opinion of White, J.) (observing that “every 
Cabinet department and about forty agencies adopted Title VI regulations 
prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination”); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196 (stating 
that approximately forty agencies adopted § 602 regulations); Mank, Private Cause, 
supra note 5, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25; Watson, supra note 54, at 947-
48; Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded 
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 
n.25 (1992) (listing Title VI regulations for several federal agencies); Note, supra 
note 49, at 1776. 
 56 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2004) (DOJ regulation); 34 C.F.R. § 
100.3(b)(2) (2004) (Department of Education regulation); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) 
(2004) (EPA regulation); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2004) (Department of 
Transportation regulation); Karlen, supra note 4, at 196 (stating that at least forty-
four agencies have adopted § 602 regulations); Note, supra note 49, at 1776 (stating 
that as of 2001, twenty-six agencies had disparate impact regulations). 
 57 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2004); see Short, supra note 4, at 119. 
 58 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2004); see Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314-15 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
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against those who file Title VI complaints.59  For instance, the 
Department of Education has issued a regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 
100.7(e), that prohibits retaliation: 
Intimidatory or retaliatory acts prohibited.  No recipient or other 
person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against 
any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or 
privilege secured by section 601 of the Act or this part [§ 602 
regulations], or because he has made a complaint, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this part.60 
Under § 602’s administrative regulations, individuals who file an 
administrative complaint with a federal agency alleging that a 
recipient of federal funds has committed discrimination have only 
limited procedural rights.61  If an individual files an administrative 
complaint, federal funding agencies will normally investigate the 
complaint, but have virtually total discretion evaluating the complaint 
and what actions they may take.62  Private complainants have no right 
to participate in the agency’s administrative investigation or to 
receive any direct compensation.63  This lack of procedural or 
compensatory rights explains why many potential complainants 
would prefer to file a private right of action in federal court, where 
they will have the right to participate and potentially receive damages 
for intentional discrimination.64 
By contrast, a recipient enjoys elaborate procedural rights to 
contest any finding of discrimination against it, especially if the 
funding agency seeks to terminate the recipient’s  funding.  If a 
funding agency uses its internal administrative processes to make a 
finding of discrimination, a recipient has a right to contest any such 
findings against it.65  A recipient may initially request a hearing before 
 
 59 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(e) (2004) (DOJ Title VI regulation). 
 60 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004) (emphasis added); see Peters, 327 F.3d at 314. 
 61 See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 12-13, 20-21 (discussing requirement in 
§ 602 that funding agency investigate private complaints of discrimination against 
funding recipients). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. at 21-23 (discussing limited procedural and substantive rights of Title VI 
complainants). 
 64 See id. at 23-24 (discussing advantages of private right of action compared to 
Title VI administrative procedures). 
 65 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (providing procedural protections for recipients of 
federal funding); 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b)(1)-(3) (providing procedural protections for 
recipients in form of EPA regulations to obtain compliance); Mank, Private Cause, 
supra note 5, at 21-23; Note, supra note 49, at 1777 (discussing complex 
administrative enforcement process for determining whether recipient has failed to 
comply with Title VI). 
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an administrative law judge, then may appeal to the agency head, and 
ultimately the federal courts if the agency seeks to terminate the 
recipient’s funding.66  Funding agencies may not file suit directly 
against allegedly discriminating recipients, but must refer any suit to 
the Attorney General and DOJ, but such suits are relatively rare.67  A 
federal funding agency must provide thirty days notice to relevant 
congressional committees before it may terminate funding to a 
recipient.68  Because of these procedural guarantees for recipients 
and the practical reality that an agency’s termination of funding to a 
recipient often would harm many innocent beneficiaries, federal 
funding agencies almost never impose the draconian remedy of 
terminating funding.  Instead, agencies usually require a recipient 
found guilty of discrimination to sign a binding settlement in which it 
agrees to end any discriminatory practices.69 
B. Introduction to Title IX 
In § 901 of Title IX, Congress declared that “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”70  In North Haven Board of Education v. 
Bell,71 the Supreme Court read Title IX’s antidiscrimination mandate 
broadly to address discrimination not expressly prohibited by the 
statute, stating that “[t]here is no doubt that ‘if we are to give [Title 
 
 66 See supra note 65. 
 67 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 & 2000d-2; Note, supra note 49, at 1777. 
 68 See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 283, 292-93 (1996) (observing that termination of funds to recipient is generally 
an ineffective administrative enforcement mechanism because federal funding 
agencies are reluctant to terminate aid to recipients and face procedural barriers 
even if they wish to do so); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 21-23 (observing that 
funding agencies frequently settle Title VI discrimination complaints against 
recipients of federal aid because termination is procedurally difficult and innocent 
beneficiaries would be hurt); Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: The Future After 
Gonzaga v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1431-32 (2003) (same) [hereinafter Mank, 
Gonzaga]; Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal 
Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 
600, 619-23 (1972) (concluding that federal government has difficult time forcing 
states to comply with federal grant-in-aid requirements because of procedural 
barriers and negative consequences of funding termination); Note, supra note 49, at 
1777 (stating agencies rarely use draconian authority to terminate funding to 
recipient because of need to notify Congress). 
 69 See supra note 68. 
 70 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
 71 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
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IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as 
broad as its language.’“72  For instance, the Court interpreted Title IX 
to allow for money damages in a private cause of action, although the 
statute does not expressly provide for such damages.73  Additionally, 
the Court implied a right in cases of sexual harassment, including 
student-on-student sexual harassment that is deliberately ignored by 
school officials.74 
Congress modeled Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
197275 after Title VI.76  Congress enacted both Title VI and Title IX 
pursuant to its Spending Clause authority and used a similar statutory 
structure.77  Additionally, the Department of Education looked to its 
Title VI regulations as a primary source for its Title IX regulations.78 
Because Title IX “was patterned after Title VI,”79 the Supreme 
Court in Cannon and subsequent decisions has by and large 
interpreted the two statutes similarly.80  In Cannon, the Court 
examined Title IX’s legislative history and concluded that the statute 
had two primary goals: “[f]irst, Congress wanted to avoid the use of 
federal resources to support discriminatory practices; [and] second, it 
wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against 
those practices.”81  Although Congress modeled Title IX’s statutory 
language after that of Title VI, Congress also intended Title IX to 
close at least some gaps in Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination in employment cases.82 
 
 72 Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1976)) (second 
alteration in original). 
 73 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 74 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 75 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 76 See infra notes 79-82, 112, 121-26, 130 and accompanying text. 
 77 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286-88 (1998); Litman 
v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 78 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2004); Litman, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 582; Short, supra note 
4, at 121. 
 79 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95 (“Title IX was patterned after Title VI . . . .  Except 
for the substitution of the word ‘sex’ in Title IX to replace the words ‘race, color, or 
national origin’ in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the 
benefitted class.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 
2002) (stating that courts should construe Title VI and Title IX in pari materia); 
Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 81 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704; see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 29, 48-49, 
59-60 (discussing Title VI and Title IX’s dual purposes). 
 82 See Julie Carroll Fay, Note, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Is 
It Really the Final Word on School Liability for Teacher-to-Student Sexual Harassment?, 31 
CONN. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1999); The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1998) [hereinafter The Supreme Court 1997 Term]. 
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In the statute’s legislative history, the primary congressional 
drafter of Title IX, Senator Bayh, stated that the “heart” of Title IX 
was to “cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, 
scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions,” to 
address issues not covered by Title VI or Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.83  Additionally, Senator Bayh stated that Title IX seeks to 
eliminate “loopholes in existing legislation relating to general 
education programs and employment resulting from those 
programs.”84  The statute applies to virtually all public and private 
educational institutions, and includes all institutional operations such 
as academic programs or athletics.85 
Pursuant to § 902 of the statute, any federal department or 
agency that “is empowered to extend [f]ederal financial assistance to 
any education program or activity” is “authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of” § 901.86  Like § 602 of Title VI, § 902 of 
Title IX requires agencies to “issue rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability” that may not “become effective unless and until 
approved by the President.”87  Similarly, § 902 provides that federal 
funding agencies may enforce “compliance with any requirement 
adopted pursuant to this section . . . by the termination of or refusal 
to grant or to continue assistance . . . .”88   
The Department of Education used its Title VI regulations as a 
primary source for its regulations under § 902 of Title IX by declaring 
that,89 “[t]he procedural provisions applicable to Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by 
reference.”90  Additionally, the Department of Education regulations 
 
 83 118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh), cited in Rowinsky v. 
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Fay, supra note 82, 
at 1490. 
 84 118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also Fay, supra note 
82, at 1490; Emmalena K. Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer 
Sexual Harassment and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1014, 1021 (1998). 
 85 See Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’ 
Unique Environment for Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realities of Athletics with 
Preventing Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 183 (2003); see also Fay, supra 
note 82, at 1489. 
 86 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 
638-39 (1999); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th 
Cir. 2002). 
 87 20 U.S.C. § 1682; Davis, 526 U.S. at 638-39; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337. 
 88 See supra note 87. 
 89 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2004); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 
579, 582 (E.D. Va. 2001); Short, supra note 4, at 121. 
 90 See supra note 89. 
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address the particular characteristics of educational institutions by 
specifying that a recipient of federal financial assistance shall not 
“administer or operate any test or other criterion for admission which 
has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of 
sex.”91  Like the parallel regulations under § 602 of Title VI, § 902 and 
its regulations set forth extensive administrative procedures for 
investigations and hearings of complaints of discrimination against 
recipients.92  The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
(hereinafter “OCR”) is a party to all proceedings and takes the lead 
in the process.93 
Complainants enjoy few rights under the Department of 
Education’s § 902 regulations.  Although the regulations give “[a]ny 
person who believes himself or any specific class of individuals to be 
subjected to discrimination” by a recipient the right to file a 
complaint,94 the regulations also state that Title IX complainants are 
not parties to the proceedings, but may only become amici curiae.95  
Under the Department of Education regulations, individuals have no 
right to a judgment for damages.96 
By contrast, Title IX recipients (like Title VI recipients)97 are 
parties to the investigation and possess extensive due process rights if 
OCR conducts hearings to consider the termination of a recipient’s 
funding.98  Section 902 explicitly requires agencies to seek voluntary 
compliance from recipients before the agency may terminate 
funding,99 and requires that the agency provide the recipient with an 
 
 91 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b) (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 120. 
 92 See 34 C.F.R. § 101 (2004); see also Fay, supra note 82, at 1492; Short, supra note 
4, at 123. 
 93 See 34 C.F.R. § 101.21 (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 122. 
 94 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2004). 
 95 34 C.F.R. § 101.23 (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 122. 
 96 Fay, supra note 82, at 1492-93. 
 97 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000 & Supp. I 2001) (providing procedural 
protections for recipients of federal funding); 40 § C.F.R. 7.130(b)(1)-(3) (2004) 
(EPA regulations providing procedural protections for recipients); Mank, Private 
Cause, supra note 5, at 21-23; Note, supra note 49, at 1777 (discussing complex 
administrative enforcement process for determining whether recipient has failed to 
comply with Title VI). 
 98 The regulations only mention two sides, the recipient (or grant applicant) and 
the Department of Education: “(a) The term party shall include an applicant or 
recipient or other person to whom a notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing 
has been mailed naming him a respondent. (b) The Assistant Secretary for Civil 
Rights of the Department of Education, shall be deemed a party to all proceedings.”  
34 C.F.R. § 101.21 (2004); see also Short, supra note 4, at 122. 
 99 20 U.S.C. § 1682(2) (2000); see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 
F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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opportunity for a hearing before any funding termination.100  
Additionally, after it makes an “express finding” of noncompliance, 
an agency may not terminate funding to a recipient until the agency 
files “a full written report” to “the committees of the House and 
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity 
involved” and waits “until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of 
such report.”101  Finally, § 903 guarantees recipients the right of 
judicial review to challenge any termination or other decision an 
agency makes pursuant to § 902.102  The OCR does not normally 
recommend termination of funding, but instead usually enters into 
binding settlements with recipients, which specify measures to avoid 
discriminatory practices in the future.103  This routine outcome is in 
part a result of Title IX’s extensive procedural protections with 
respect to recipients (which are similar to the protections under Title 
VI).104 
II.  TITLE VI, TITLE IX, AND PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
Because the Title VI and Title IX administrative processes 
provide limited procedural rights and no right of compensation to 
complainants, a number of plaintiffs have attempted to enforce 
either Title VI or Title IX as a private right of action in federal court, 
where plaintiffs potentially have the full panoply of procedural rights, 
including discovery, the right to a trial, and equitable or 
compensatory remedies.105  Like most statutes enacted during the 
1960s,106 Title VI is silent regarding whether private individuals who 
allege that a recipient has discriminated against them may bring a 
private right of action.107  In 1964, when Congress enacted Title VI, 
the Supreme Court had recently adopted a liberal approach to 
implied private rights of action in its seminal decision, J.I. Case Co. v. 
Borak,108 which allowed private investors to bring private suits for 
securities fraud because it would advance the general purposes of the 
 
 100 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (2000); see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337. 
 101 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000); see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337. 
 102 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (2000); see also Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1337. 
 103 See Short, supra note 4, at 123. 
 104 See supra note 97. 
 105 See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 23-24 (discussing advantages of private 
right of action compared to Title VI administrative procedures). 
 106 Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal 
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 816, 846-47 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, Context]; 
Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 225. 
 107 Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 225. 
 108 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
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statute despite the absence of any explicit textual support in the 
statute.109  Until the middle 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts liberally construed the Borak holding to allow private plaintiffs 
to file statutory suits even if a statute did not contain an explicit 
remedy for individual suits.  Often, such statutes only explicitly 
allowed, for instance, suits by federal administrative agencies.110  
During the 1960s and 1970s, several lower court decisions concluded 
that Title VI established a private cause of action.111  When it enacted 
Title IX in 1972, Congress was aware of these decisions implying a 
private right of action under Title VI.112 
However, in 1975, the Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash,113 adopted a 
four-part test for determining whether a private right of action was 
implied in a statute, with congressional intent being one factor.114  
 
 109 Id. at 431-33 (stating that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such 
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose” expressed by 
a statute); Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 845. 
 110 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (Social Security Act of 1935, as 
amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting 
Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964); see also 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The 
Supreme Court implied private rights of action with a relatively free hand until its 
decision in Cort v. Ash.”) (citations omitted), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1832 (June 14, 
2004); Key, supra note 68, at 294 (describing the effect of Borak on private rights of 
action); Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1423; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 
25-27 (discussing Supreme Court and lower court cases from 1964 until late 1970s 
that found implied private right of action in federal statutes); Michael A. Mazzuchi, 
Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 1062, 1073-74 (1992) (observing that between 1964 and 1975 the Supreme 
Court took an expansive approach to private rights of action).  But see Susan J. 
Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Rights of 
Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 866, 867 & nn.32 & 34 (1996) (arguing that 
courts were reluctant before 1975 to imply private rights of action, except perhaps in 
securities area). 
 111 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 n.20 (1979) (citing Bossier 
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967); S. Christian Leadership 
Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940, 942-43 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Gautreaux 
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967)); see also Mank, Context, 
supra note 106, at 848 n.213; Stabile, supra note 110, at 891 n.165. 
 112 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-98 (presuming both that Congress was aware of cases 
interpreting Title VI and intended to follow that interpretation for Title IX); 
Courtney G. Joslin, Recognizing a Cause of Action Under Title IX for Student-Student Sexual 
Harassment, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201, 207 (1999); infra notes 121-26, 130 and 
accompanying text. 
 113 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 114 Id. at 78 (stating four-part test: (1) is plaintiff part of a class that statute intends 
to provide with special status or benefits?; (2) is there implicit or explicit evidence 
that Congress intended to create or deny the proposed private right of action?; (3) is 
such a private right of action consistent with underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme to imply such a remedy for plaintiff?; and (4) is the cause of action one 
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Although the Court likely intended the Cort four-part test to limit the 
creation of new implied private rights of action, the courts of appeals 
continued to create them in at least twenty instances from 1975 until 
1979.115  A key question was whether the Court would affirm lower 
court decisions creating a private right of action under Title VI or 
Title IX in light of the Cort test. 
A. Cannon v. University of Chicago: Recognizing a Private Right 
of Action Under Title IX and Title VI 
1. Cannon Recognizes a Private Right of Action Under 
Title IX 
The Supreme Court’s Cannon decision recognized a private right 
to bring an action in federal court against various educational 
institutions receiving federal funds under § 901(a) of Title IX.116  
Cannon was the Court’s last major case to adopt a broad 
interpretation of implied private rights of action under the Cort four-
part test.117  Under Cort’s first prong,118 the Court found that the 
plaintiff was a member of the class that the statute was intended to 
benefit—namely, students.119 
Under Cort’s second prong, whether Congress intended to 
establish a private right of action,120 the Court found that Congress 
had intended that there be a right of action under Title IX, because 
 
traditionally relegated to state law, and thus in an area where a federal cause of 
action would intrude on important state concerns?); see also Mank, Private Cause, 
supra note 5, at 26-27 & n.159; Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI’s 
Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 354-551 (2000) [hereinafter Mank, 
Section 1983]; Stabile, supra note 110, at 867 & n.38. 
 115 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 741-42 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Mank, 
Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1424; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 27 & n.159. 
 116 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 28-30; Fay, 
supra note 82, at 1494-95. 
 117 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709 (finding that all factors in Cort’s four-part test favor 
conclusion that Title IX creates private right of action); see also Fay, supra note 82, at 
1494-95 (discussing Cannon’s use of the Cort four-part test); Joslin, supra note 112, at 
219-20 (same); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 28 (same).  The first three 
prongs are discussed in the text of this Article.  Cort’s fourth prong, whether the 
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, and thus in an area where a 
federal cause of action would intrude on important state concerns, was easily 
addressed because the federal government since the Civil War has taken the leading 
role in combating discrimination. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708-09; Fay, supra note 82, at 
1495; Joslin, supra note 112, at 207. 
 118 Cort’s first prong is whether the plaintiff is part of a class that the statute 
intends to benefit.  Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
 119  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694. 
 120 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
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it had patterned the statute after Title VI, while being aware that 
courts had already recognized such a right under Title VI.121  Because 
Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI, including the use of 
virtually identical statutory language and the same procedures for 
termination of funding, the Cannon decision relied on prior 
interpretation of Title VI’s language, legislative history, and 
regulations as strong indicators of Congress’ intent to create a private 
right of action under Title IX.122  Accordingly, courts and 
commentators have interpreted Cannon to recognize a private right 
of action under both statutes.123  Justice Stevens’ majority opinion first 
observed, “[t]he drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would 
be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding 
eight years.”124  The Justice then noted that “[i]n 1972 when Title IX 
was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been 
construed as creating a private remedy.”125  The Court stated that it 
was appropriate to assume that Congress was aware of the numerous 
lower federal court decisions interpreting Title VI as creating a 
private right of action when it enacted Title IX, and hence, that the 
legislature assumed that Title IX likewise created a private right of 
action.126 
Additionally, acknowledging that Cort and other recent decisions 
by the Court had begun to apply a “strict approach” in deciding 
whether to create a private right of action, the Cannon Court 
determined that its “evaluation of congressional action in 1972 must 
take into account its contemporary legal context”; that is, the more 
liberal standard used in deciding whether Congress, when it enacted 
Title IX, intended to create such a private right of action.127  Because 
the Court had in six cases from 1964 to 1972 recognized a private 
cause of action in statutes that included no specific reference to these 
 
 121 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96. 
 122 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-703; see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 28. 
 123 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-703; Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of 
Canton, 882 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1989); Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & 
Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1987); Chowdbury v. Reading 
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts have consistently 
held the [Title IX] language of Cannon to be applicable in discussions of Title VI.”); 
118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57 
nn.140-41. 
 124 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.16; see also United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 
1548 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Fisher, supra note 53, at 318, 329. 
 125 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696; see also id. at nn.20-21 (citing cases); Bossier Parish 
Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 126 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-703, 710-11. 
 127 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99; Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 847-49. 
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remedies, the Cannon Court held that there was an implied private 
right of action under Title IX and, by implication, under Title VI, 
because the former statute was modeled upon the latter one.128  In his 
concurring opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist, who has generally 
opposed implied private causes of action,129 conceded that Congress 
had probably assumed when it enacted Titles VI and IX that courts 
would decide whether a civil rights statute contained an implied 
private right of action.  Justice Rehnquist observed: 
We do not write on an entirely clean slate, however, and the 
Court’s opinion demonstrates that Congress, at least during the 
period of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights 
Act tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide 
whether there should be a private right of action, rather than 
determining this question for itself.  Cases such as J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, and numerous cases from other federal courts, gave 
Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary would 
undertake this task.130 
 In addressing Cort’s third prong, whether a private right of 
action would serve the statute’s purposes,131 the Cannon court 
concluded that Titles IX and VI “sought to accomplish two related, 
but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives.”132  First, Congress 
intended to prohibit the use of federal funds to support recipients’ 
discriminatory practices.133  The Court observed that private litigation 
is not essential in serving this purpose because the federal funding 
agency can deter discriminatory practices by using the statutory 
procedure for termination of federal financial support to a recipient 
engaged in such behavior.134  Additionally, however, the Cannon 
decision concluded that Congress had intended the statute not only 
to prevent the use of federal funds to support discriminatory 
programs, but also to “provide individual citizens effective protection 
 
 128 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 n.23; Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 848 (discussing 
Title VI implied right of action cases relied upon by Cannon court); Mank, Private 
Cause, supra note 5, at 28-29. 
 129 Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 849-50 (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
has usually opposed courts finding implied private right of action absent evidence of 
clear congressional intent to create such a remedy); Stabile, supra, note 110, at 884-
85 n.131 (observing that Justice Rehnquist in his Cannon concurrence stated his 
general opposition to judicially implied private right of action absent evidence of 
clear congressional intent to create such a remedy). 
 130 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Mank, Context, 
supra note 106, at 849-50. 
 131 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
 132 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704; see also Fay, supra note 82, at 1494-95. 
 133 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. 
 134 Id. 
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against these practices.”135  The Court determined that only private 
remedies could secure the statute’s interest in protecting individuals.  
The Court also noted that a complainant could not participate in the 
administrative process.136  Moreover, the Court observed that the 
administrative process provided no assurance that a finding of a 
violation would result in relief for the complainant.137  Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that a private remedy was consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme and would not 
interfere with the agency’s administrative enforcement process.138  
Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning implied that there should be a 
private right of action under both Title VI and Title IX because both 
failed to provide direct remedies for complainants and allowed the 
funding agency only the indirect remedy of terminating a recipient’s 
funding.139  Cannon did not explicitly address whether there is a 
private right of action under either Title VI or Title IX’s regulations 
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.140 
Although the Cannon decision did not explicitly hold that there 
was an implied right of action under Title VI, commentators and 
courts have overwhelmingly interpreted Cannon as clearly implying 
such a right.141  In Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission, Justice 
White observed, “it was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon Court’s 
opinion that the congressional view was correct as to the availability 
of private actions to enforce Title VI.”142  In 1992, the Court 
reaffirmed Cannon’s private right of action, unanimously holding in 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,143 that plaintiffs in a Title IX 
case may receive compensatory damages from a school district for 
intentional discrimination, including sexual harassment by a teacher 
against a student, when a student notified the district about the 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 706-07 n.41. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 704-08. 
 139 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707 n.41. 
 140 See Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 30. 
 141 See supra note 123.  Because § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 
was also modeled on Title VI and contains nearly identical language to both Titles VI 
and IX, most courts interpret Title VI in light of Title IX and § 504 case law.  See 
United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 
(1986); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (noting that § 504 was 
originally proposed as an amendment to Title VI); Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57 
n.140.  But see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 n.13 (1984) 
(recognizing differences between Title VI and § 504). 
 142 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 594. 
 143 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
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harassment, but the district failed to stop the harassment.144  The 
Court stated, “the point of not permitting monetary damages for an 
unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds 
lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.  This notice 
problem does not arise in a case such as this, in which intentional 
discrimination is alleged.”145  Thus, under both Titles VI and IX, 
plaintiffs may receive monetary damages if they can prove a recipient 
engaged in intentionally discriminatory practices that harmed 
them.146 
2.  After Cannon, the Supreme Court Restricts Private 
Rights of Action 
In his dissenting opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell argued that 
courts should recognize an implied private right of action only where 
there is clear evidence in the statute that Congress intended such a 
right.147  The Supreme Court has never overruled Cannon’s holding 
that there is an implied right of action under Title IX.148  However, 
since 1979, the Court has increasingly curtailed its recognition of 
implied private rights of action, as evinced by the Court’s requiring 
plaintiffs to prove that Congress intended to authorize remedies for 
private litigants.149  The Court has considered the remaining three 
Cort factors only to the extent that they help courts understand such 
 
 144 Id. at 63-65, 74-75; see also Joslin, supra note 112, at 207-09 (discussing Franklin). 
 145 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (citation omitted); see also Joslin, supra note 112, at 
208-09 (discussing Franklin). 
 146 See Fay, supra note 82, at 1501. 
 147 441 U.S. 748 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 148 In Jackson, the court stated: 
The Supreme Court has plainly receded from the four-part Cort analysis 
that animated Cannon, focusing instead only on congressional intent to 
create a private right of action . . . .  But the Court has not overturned 
the specific holding of Cannon, and so a direct victim of gender 
discrimination still may pursue a private right of action under Title IX 
to remedy the discrimination she has suffered. 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 149 The Jackson court stated: 
Since the late 1970’s, the Court has gradually receded from reliance on 
three of these four factors, focusing more and more exclusively on 
legislative intent alone [citing cases].  Sandoval is the culmination of 
this trend, announcing that “statutory intent . . . is determinative.”  The 
other three Cort factors remain relevant only insofar as they provide 
evidence of Congress’s intent. 
Id. at 1339 n.5 (citations omitted); see also Karlen, supra note 4, at 197; Key, supra 
note 68, at 294-96; Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1423-25; Mank, Private Right, 
supra note 5, at 31-32, 44-46; Stabile, supra note 110, at 868-71. 
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legislative intent.150  Justice Scalia, who in Sandoval and other 
decisions has sought to restrict judicially implied private rights of 
action, subsequently described Cannon as “exemplifi[ng]” an 
“expansive rights-creating approach” to inferring private rights of 
action from statutes that lack any explicit textual support for such 
remedies and indicated that the Court would not use that approach 
in addressing any new private rights claims.151 
For instance, in 2001, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,152 
the Court rejected an implied right of action for even constitutional 
violations.153  The Malesko Court limited its decision in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,154 which had recognized 
an implied right of action for illegal governmental searches in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.155  In a concurring opinion in 
Malesko, Justice Scalia declared, “the heady days in which this Court 
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing 
them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or 
constitutional prohibition” are gone.156  Some plaintiffs have filed § 
1983 suits for alleged statutory violations in order to avoid these 
limitations, but the Court has begun to close off that alternative 
avenue of litigation as well.157 
B. Guardians: A Muddy Title VI Decision 
In 1983, in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission,158 a deeply 
divided Supreme Court issued a complex opinion which held that 
proof of intentional discrimination is required under § 601 of Title 
VI, but also indicated that an agency implementing regulations under 
§ 602 may prohibit disparate impact discrimination.159  The Guardians 
 
 150 See supra note 149. 
 151 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
 152 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 153 Id. at 66-69; see also Karlen, supra note 4, at 197 (discussing Malesko). 
 154 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 155 See Karlen, supra note 4, at 197-98 (discussing Bivens). 
 156 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Karlen, supra note 4, at 
197.  
 157 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (limiting enforcement of 
rights under § 1983 to statutes in which there is “clear” and “unambiguous” evidence 
that Congress intended to create an individual right); see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra 
note 68, at 1420-21, 1446-51, 1480-82 (discussing to what extent Gonzaga limited § 
1983 suits); Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of 
a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1838-41, 1854-58, 1881-
87 (2003) (same); infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text. 
 158 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
 159 See id. at 584 n.2; see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 13-15; Mank, Title 
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Court looked both back to its liberal approach to private rights of 
action in its recent Cannon opinion as well as forward to its 
increasingly narrow jurisprudence limiting such rights of action.160  
The decision involved two difficult but interrelated questions: first, 
the substantive standard for defining “discrimination” under Title VI 
and second, the remedies available to private plaintiffs who proved 
discrimination in violation of the statute.161 
In Guardians, the plaintiffs were black and Hispanic members of 
the New York City Police Department who alleged that the 
department had violated the Department of Labor’s Title VI 
regulations, which barred recipients from engaging in practices 
having racially disparate impacts,162 by using biased written 
examinations to make initial hiring decisions and to decide layoffs 
among officers with equal seniority.163  The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found sufficient evidence 
of disparate impacts as a result of the examinations to establish a 
violation of Title VI, and awarded the plaintiffs compensatory relief.164  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, 
reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that Title VI 
required proof of discriminatory intent rather than simply a disparate 
impact.165  The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit, 
determining that a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to 
obtain compensatory relief under Title VI.166  However, five justices 
arguably concluded, or at least implied, that Title VI plaintiffs who 
 
VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 523-27. 
 160 See supra notes 117, 142, 149-50 and accompanying text & infra notes 169-76, 
218-20, 227 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting interpretations of whether 
Guardians’s majority adopted narrow or broad approach to private rights of action 
under Title VI). 
 161 See Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524; Mello, supra note 43, at 965. 
 162 See 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(1) (2004); Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 
524. 
 163 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; See also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14; 
Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524. 
 164 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y. City Police Dep’t, Inc. 
v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also 
Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 
524. 
 165 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; see also Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y. City Police 
Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 633 F.2d 232, 270 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kelleher, 
J., concurring); id. at 274 (Coffin, J., concurring); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, 
at 14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524. 
 166 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 
612, 615 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also Colopy, supra note 4, at 159; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 
14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524. 
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proved that a recipient’s practices caused disparate impacts were 
entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief.167 
In Guardians, a majority concluded that § 601 prohibited only 
intentional discrimination.168  The opinion by Justice White suggested 
that the recipient must have knowledge of the intentional conduct, 
stating that it was not “uncommon in the law for the extent of a 
defendant’s liability to turn on the extent of his knowledge.”169  By 
contrast, Justices White and Marshall argued in separate concurring 
and dissenting opinions that § 601’s definition of “discrimination” 
included a prohibition against practices that result in disparate 
impacts on protected minority groups.170 
Nonetheless, even though the Court concluded that § 601 only 
bars intentional discrimination, five members of the Guardians Court 
stated or strongly implied that § 602 authorizes federal agencies to 
issue regulations prohibiting recipient practices that result in 
disparate impact discrimination.171  For instance, Justice Stevens, in 
his dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun), 
argued that § 601 prohibits intentional discrimination, and that § 602 
authorizes disparate impact regulations: “[A]lthough petitioners had 
to prove that the respondents’ actions were motivated by an invidious 
intent in order to prove a violation of [Title VI], they only had to 
show that the respondents’ actions were producing discriminatory 
 
 167 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 (opinion of White, J.) (stating that only 
declaratory and injunctive relief was appropriate); id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting, 
joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ. ); id. at 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (would 
allow full compensation); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524; 
Mello, supra note 43, at 965. 
 168 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment, joined by 
Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.); id. at 612, 615 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 
id. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); see also 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280; Colopy, supra note 4, at 159; Mank, Private Cause, supra 
note 5, at 14; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524. 
 169 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 597 n.20 (opinion of White, J.); see also Anne D. Byrne, 
Casenote and Comment, School District Liability Under Title IX for Sexual Abuse of a 
Student by a Teacher, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 587, 600 (1999). 
 170 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615, 
623 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14, 33; 
Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 524-25; Mello, supra note 43, at 965. 
 171 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 591-95 (opinion of White, J.) (“The 
threshold issue before the Court is whether the private plaintiffs in this case need to 
prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI . . . and administrative 
implementing regulations promulgated thereunder.  I conclude, as do four other 
Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of 
discriminatory intent.”); id. at 635-39, 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by 
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 623, 625-26, 634 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also 
Colopy, supra note 4, at 159; Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 14, 33-34; Mank, 
Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 525-27; Mello, supra note 43, at 965-68. 
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effects in order to prove a violation of [the regulations].”172  Justice 
Stevens argued that prior precedent, including Lau, supported the 
authority of federal agencies to issue disparate impact regulations 
pursuant to § 602.173  Additionally, the Justice contended that the 
plaintiffs could enforce and receive compensation for violations of § 
602 disparate impact regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the 
regulations were reasonably related to the purposes of the statute and 
therefore had the “force of law” under § 1983.174  Justices White and 
Marshall each would have allowed disparate impact suits under either 
§ 601 or § 602.175  Accordingly, five members of the Guardians 
Court—Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens—
suggested or averred that plaintiffs could enforce § 602 disparate 
impact regulations, either directly as an implied right of action or 
indirectly through § 1983.176 
In 1985, in Alexander v. Choate,177 the Supreme Court addressed 
whether plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case under § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973178 by proving disparate impact 
discrimination.179  Because Congress modeled § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act on Title VI and used nearly identical language, 
Choate relied on the Court’s Title VI jurisprudence, especially the 
Guardians decision.180  The Court conceded that “Title VI itself 
 
 172 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Private Cause, 
supra note 5, at 14-15, 34; Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 525. 
 173 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Title VI 
Regulations, supra note 43, at 525. 
 174 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Section 
1983, supra note 114, at 341 (discussing Justice Stevens’ argument that Title VI’s 
disparate impact regulations are enforceable through § 1983); Mank, Title VI 
Regulations, supra note 43, at 525-26 Mello, supra note 43, at 965, 967-68. 
 175 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 615, 
623 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 15, 33-34; 
Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 526-27. 
 176 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 635-45 
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 615, 623-26, 634 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. 
Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1997) (summarizing Guardians and concluding that 
five justices determined that plaintiffs could enforce § 602 disparate impact 
regulations), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra 
note 43, at 525-27. 
 177 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 178  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 179 Choate, 469 U.S. at 290-91; see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 
527. 
 180 Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 n.13 (explaining that § 504 was originally proposed as 
an amendment to Title VI); see also United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed 
Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 (1986) (stating that § 504 and its regulations were 
modeled after Title VI); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 527; 
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directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.”181  
However, the Choate decision unanimously read Guardians to 
authorize federal agencies to issue § 602 regulations forbidding 
recipient practices resulting in disparate impact discrimination, 
stating that “[t]he [Guardians] Court held that actions having an 
unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed 
through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of 
Title VI.”182  Additionally, the Choate Court indicated in dicta that 
Guardians had suggested that there was an implied private right of 
action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations: “Guardians 
suggests that the regulations implementing § 504, upon which 
respondents in part rely, could make actionable the disparate impact 
challenged in this case.”183 
C. Sandoval: Rejecting Private Rights of Action for Disparate Impact 
Regulations 
1. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion: No Private Right of 
Action Under Title VI for Disparate Impact 
Discrimination 
Although neither Guardians nor Choate clearly decided whether a 
private right of action exists to enforce § 602 disparate impact 
regulations, these decisions arguably implied such a result.  Every 
federal court of appeals that addressed this question before Sandoval 
concluded that private plaintiffs may bring a private right of action to 
enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations.184  However, in Sandoval, 
 
Colopy, supra note 4, at 156-57 n.140.  But see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 
624, 632-33 n.13 (1984) (recognizing differences between Title VI and § 504). 
 181 Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 527. 
 182 Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 527. 
 183 Choate, 469 U.S. at 294 (footnote omitted); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, 
supra note 43, at 527-28. 
 184 See, e.g., Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 501-07 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d sub 
nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397-
400 (3d Cir. 1999); Ferguson v. Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on 
other grounds, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 
1996); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); City 
of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1995); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 
1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); see 
also Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) (dictum); Latinos 
Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 
1986) (dictum); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465-66 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(dictum); Mank, Private Cause, supra note 5, at 35-36 n.209; Rosenbaum & 
Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 225 n.53.  One decision, New York City Envtl. Justice 
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000), questioned but did not decide 
whether there is a private right of action to enforce § 602 disparate impact 
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the Supreme Court held that § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate 
impact practices do not create a federal private right of action.185  The 
Sandoval plaintiffs claimed that the § 602 disparate impact regulations 
established a private right of action.186  They contended that the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety’s policy of administering its 
driver’s license examination only in English established a prima facie 
case of disparate impact discrimination in violation of the relevant § 
602 regulations.187 
To determine the meaning of § 602, the Sandoval Court 
emphasized that its purpose was “to effectuate the provisions of [§ 
601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general 
applicability.”188  Acknowledging that Guardians and Choate had 
established that § 601 creates an implied private right of action 
against intentional discrimination, the Sandoval Court observed that 
“private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain 
both injunctive relief and damages.”189  Concluding that Guardians 
and Choate were not controlling precedent, Justice Scalia, writing the 
majority opinion, determined that the present case raised the 
different question of whether there is a private right of action to 
enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact 
discrimination.190  Rejecting Justice Stevens’ argument that the 
Cannon decision had implicitly recognized a private right of action to 
enforce disparate impact regulations,191 the Court concluded that 
although Cannon had held “that Title IX created a private right of 
action to enforce its ban on intentional discrimination,” that decision 
did not “consider whether the right reached regulations barring 
disparate-impact discrimination.”192  Similarly, rejecting any argument 
that the Guardians decision had held or implied that there was a 
private right of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting 
disparate impact discrimination, the Sandoval Court determined that 
Guardians merely “held that private individuals could not recover 
compensatory damages under Title VI except for intentional 
 
regulations.  See id. at 69-72. 
 185 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293. 
 186 Id. at 278-79. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 278 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1) (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Short, supra note 4, at 126. 
 189 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81 (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 293; Guardians, 463 U.S. 
at 610-11); see also Short, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
 190 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81; see also Short, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
 191 See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. 
 192 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282; see also Short, supra note 4, at 126. 
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discrimination.”193  Moreover, the Court concluded that Justice 
Stevens’ Guardians opinion had not addressed the “question of a 
direct private right of action to enforce the regulations,” because it 
was not an issue presented in the case.194 
The Sandoval Court determined that plaintiffs may not file a 
private right of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting 
disparate impact discrimination because those regulations go beyond 
the core prohibition against intentional discrimination in § 601.  
Although the Court’s 1974 Lau decision had implied that both § 601 
and § 602 prohibited disparate impact discrimination, subsequent 
decisions had made it “clear now that the disparate-impact 
regulations do not simply apply § 601—since they indeed forbid 
conduct that § 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right 
of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce 
these regulations.”195  Furthermore, “assum[ing] for purposes of this 
decision that § 602 confers the authority to promulgate disparate-
impact regulations,” the Sandoval Court stated, “the question remains 
whether it confers a private right of action to enforce them.  If not, 
we must conclude that a failure to comply with regulations 
promulgated under § 602 that is not also a failure to comply with § 
601 is not actionable.”196 
In determining whether § 602 disparate impact regulations 
establish a private right of action, the Sandoval Court used its post-
Cort principle that “private rights of action to enforce federal law 
must be created by Congress.”197  With respect to statutory intent, the 
Sandoval Court refused to consider whether a private right of action 
would serve Title VI’s purposes or even whether Congress in 1964 
assumed that courts would imply a private right of action.  The Court 
observed that, since Cort v. Ash, it had consistently rejected Borak’s 
view that “‘it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such 
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional 
purpose’ expressed by a statute,” even when the Court reviewed 
statutes enacted before Cort v. Ash was decided.198  Rejecting the 
respondents’ argument that it should apply Borak’s approach to a 
statute enacted just after that decision, the Sandoval Court declared, 
 
 193 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282-83; see also Short, supra note 4, at 126. 
 194 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 283 n.3.  But see id. at 300 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(taking issue with the Court’s reading of his statement in Guardians). 
 195 Id. at 284. 
 196 Id. at 286; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 859; Short, supra note 4, at 
127. 
 197 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. 
 198 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 433). 
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“[h]aving sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s intent, 
we will not accept respondents’ invitation to have one last drink.”199 
2. A Textualist Approach to Private Rights of Action 
The Sandoval Court focused on the text of § 602 in deciding 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action to 
enforce regulations promulgated under § 602.  Applying a textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation, the Court observed that “[t]he 
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine 
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also 
a private remedy.  Statutory intent on this latter point is 
determinative.”200  The Court concluded that “[w]e therefore begin 
(and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent with the 
text and structure of Title VI.”201  The Court’s focus on the statute’s 
text in determining whether a statute established a private right of 
action led it to reject the respondents’ argument that rights might 
arise from agency regulations.202  The Court announced that 
“[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that 
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that 
Congress has not.”203  The Court emphasized that regulations alone 
may not create individual rights, stating that “it is most certainly 
incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private 
cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress.  Agencies 
may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.”204 
 
 199 Id.; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 859-60; Short, supra note 4, at 128. 
 200 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 201 Id. at 288; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860; Short, supra note 4, at 
128-29. 
 202 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860; Short, 
supra note 4, at 129. 
 203 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added); see also Mank, Context, supra note 
106, at 860; Short, supra note 4, at 129. 
 204 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.  Lower courts have disagreed as to what extent 
agency regulations may guide courts in defining statutory rights.  Compare Save Our 
Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding valid agency 
regulations such as Title VI disparate impact regulations could not establish 
individual rights enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress may establish 
enforceable rights through statutes and Title VI only prohibited intentional 
discrimination), and Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies 
and the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613 (arguing that Title VI 
regulations do not establish right enforceable under § 1983), with Langlois v. 
Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 50-53 (D. Mass. 2002) (concluding that 
valid agency regulations may establish individual rights enforceable through § 1983, 
and holding that certain HUD regulations under Title VIII, Fair Housing Act of 
1968, are enforceable through § 1983, and also suggesting in dicta that Title VI 
disparate impact regulations are enforceable through § 1983), and Recent Case, Save 
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Because of its textualist approach, the Sandoval Court refused to 
apply the approach it had used in Cannon; namely, considering the 
contemporary legal context of liberal implication of private rights of 
action in Borak and other decisions at the time Congress enacted 
Title VI in 1964.205  The Sandoval majority went on to disagree “with 
the Government that our cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to 
Cort v. Ash have given dispositive weight to the expectations that the 
enacting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary legal 
context.”206  The Court responded that “legal context matters only to 
the extent it clarifies text.”207  A strong argument can be made, 
however, that courts should consider the contemporary legal context 
in which Congress enacted a statute to understand the text of the 
statute.208 
Because the text of § 602 does not include any explicit provision 
authorizing private remedies, the Sandoval decision concluded that 
there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact 
regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI.209  The Court also 
determined that subsequent amendments to Title VI did not provide 
sufficient evidence that Congress intended to create a private right of 
action to enforce § 602’s regulations, because those amendments did 
not explicitly recognize such remedies, even if many members of 
Congress tacitly assumed that they existed because of numerous lower 
court decisions implying such rights.210  Accordingly, the Sandoval 
decision held that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as later 
amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding 
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 
602.  We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”211 
However, Sandoval acknowledged that plaintiffs could still bring 
a private action against recipients by alleging that they had 
 
Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 735 
(2003) (criticizing Ninth Circuit’s holding in Save Our Valley that Title VI regulations 
do not establish right enforceable under § 1983). 
 205 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 817, 859-60, 
866-70 (arguing that Sandoval decision was wrong in failing to consider 
contemporary legal context of liberal implication of private rights of action when 
Congress enacted Title VI in 1964); Short, supra note 4, at 128 (discussing Sandoval 
decision’s rejection of contemporary legal context doctrine). 
 206 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287-88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207 Id. at 286. 
 208 See supra note 205. 
 209 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-92; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860. 
 210 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291-92; see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 860-61; 
Short, supra note 4, at 129. 
 211 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293. 
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committed intentional discrimination in violation of either § 601 or 
“regulations applying § 601’s ban on intentional discrimination.”212  
Citing Chevron, the Court stated that regulations, including those 
promulgated under § 602, were enforceable to the extent that they 
effectuated § 601’s core prohibition against intentional 
discrimination: 
We do not doubt that regulations applying § 601’s ban on 
intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to 
enforce that section.  Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, 
authoritatively construe the statute itself . . . .  A Congress that 
intends the statute to be enforced through a private cause of 
action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be 
so enforced as well.213 
As discussed in Parts IV.B.3 and V.C, infra, according to this 
reasoning, anti-retaliation regulations under Title VI or Title IX 
would be enforceable if they addressed § 601 or § 901’s ban on 
intentional discrimination, rather than practices causing disparate 
impacts.214 
Furthermore, the Sandoval Court in dicta questioned the validity 
of the § 602 disparate impact regulations, although it did not decide 
the issue because the petitioners had not challenged the regulations, 
but only whether they were enforceable through a private right of 
action.215  Questioning whether § 602’s disparate impact regulations 
were consistent with its precedent holding that § 601 prohibits only 
intentional discrimination,216 the Court “observ[ed] . . . how strange it 
is to say that disparate-impact regulations are ‘inspired by, at the 
service of, and inseparably intertwined with’ § 601, when § 601 
 
 212 Id. at 284. 
 213 Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 
251, 257 (1995); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44). 
 214 See infra text accompanying notes 334-40, 360-63, 404, 409-10. 
 215 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82. 
 216 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82.  But see Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 
43, at 519-20 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question 
the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations because the statute’s 
legislative history and subsequent related amendments support their validity); 
Galalis, supra note 43, at 65, 92-101 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision 
was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations 
because they are entitled to deference under Chevron, because term “discrimination” 
in § 602 is ambiguous, and disparate impact regulations are reasonable 
interpretations of statute); Note, supra note 49, at 1781 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s 
Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate 
impact regulations because they deserve deference under Chevron, § 602 is 
ambiguous, and disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretations and 
means to effectuate § 601’s antidiscrimination requirement). 
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permits the very behavior that the regulations forbid.”217  Justice Scalia 
conceded that prior decisions of the Court had suggested that § 602’s 
disparate impact regulations were valid.  The justice stated that 
“[t]hough no opinion of this Court has held that, five Justices in 
Guardians voiced that view of the law at least as alternative grounds 
for their decisions,”218 and that “dictum in Alexander v. Choate is to the 
same effect.”219  Despite this precedent, Justice Scalia argued that 
Guardians’ and Choate’s approval of disparate impact regulations 
under § 602 was “in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and 
Guardians that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination.”220 
3. Justice Stevens’ Dissenting Opinion 
In a dissenting opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the Court should 
consider the contemporary legal context at the time Congress 
enacted the statute in 1964221 and, therefore, interpret Title VI to 
create an implied right of action for enforcing § 602 regulations 
because “[a]t the time of the promulgation of these regulations, 
prevailing principles of statutory construction assumed that Congress 
intended a private right of action whenever such a cause of action was 
necessary to protect individual rights granted by valid federal law.”222  
Additionally, while acknowledging that Cannon did not directly 
address whether there was a private cause of action for § 602 
disparate impact regulations, Justice Stevens argued that the Cannon 
decision supported recognizing such a right because the Court had 
not distinguished between intentional and unintentional 
discrimination when it concluded that Congress had assumed that 
there would be an implied right of action under Title IX in the face 
of judicial decisions that had already recognized such a right under 
Title VI.223  Justice Stevens stated: 
 
 217 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 n.6 (quoting id. at 306-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) 
(internal cross reference omitted). 
 218 Id. at 281-82 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591-52 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 
623 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 643-645 (Stevens, J., dissenting,)). 
 219 Id. at 282 (citing Choate, 469 U.S. at 293, 295 n.11). 
 220 Id. (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-13 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment)).  But see supra note 216. 
 221 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294, 312-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, 
supra note 106, at 861-67; Short, supra note 4, at 130. 
 222 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra 
note 106, at 861-67; Short, supra note 4, at 130. 
 223 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297-99, 312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, 
Context, supra note 106, at 862-63, 867.  However, Justice Stevens conceded that 
reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether Cannon had resolved whether Title IX 
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The opinion in Cannon . . . does not draw any distinctions 
between the various types of discrimination outlawed by the 
operation of those statutes. . . .  [I]t could hardly have been more 
clear as to the scope of its holding: A private right of action exists 
for “victims of the prohibited discrimination.”  Not some of the 
prohibited discrimination, but all of it.224 
Furthermore, Justice Stevens maintained that the statute and 
regulations were so interconnected that it was reasonable to assume 
that if Congress had intended to allow a private cause of action under 
§ 601, then it was also reasonable to assume there would be a cause of 
action under § 602.225  The dissent contended that “[s]ection 601 
does not stand in isolation, but rather as part of an integrated 
remedial scheme.  Section 602 exists for the sole purpose of 
forwarding the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601.”226  Justice 
Stevens also argued that the Court in Lau, Guardians, and Choate, as 
well as numerous lower courts, had for over thirty years consistently 
approved § 602 disparate impact regulations as advancing § 601’s 
antidiscrimination prohibition, even if § 602 regulations were 
broader in some ways than those promulgated under § 601.227 
Justice Stevens further argued that the majority’s refusal to defer 
to the agency’s § 602 regulations was contrary to the Chevron 
doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an appropriate agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term such as 
“discrimination.”228  Justice Stevens argued, “[i]n most other contexts, 
when the agencies charged with administering a broadly-worded 
statute offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete 
guidance as to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of the 
statute’s breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable 
construction of the statutory text.”229  Under Chevron, there is a good 
 
contained an implied right of action for disparate impact discrimination.  Sandoval, 
532 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 859 
n.277. 
 224 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297-99, 312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); 
see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, at 862-67; Short, supra note 4, at 131. 
 225 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra 
note 106, at 861-65; Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 242; Short, supra 
note 4, at 131-32. 
 226 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 227 Id. at 301-02, 305 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Context, supra note 106, 
at 861-65; Short, supra note 4, at 132. 
 228 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 
837); see also Mank, Title VI Regulations, supra note 43, at 530 (arguing that majority 
opinion in Sandoval ignored Chevron deference principle); Short, supra note 4, at 
133. 
 229 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 
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argument that courts should defer to agency interpretations of Title 
VI and Title IX, because the term “discrimination” in these statutes is 
ambiguous.230 
Justice Stevens contended that the majority opinion might have 
little significance because, even if there was no private right of action 
available to enforce § 602 regulations, a suit under § 1983 could 
enforce those same regulations indirectly because of its broader 
standards for enforcing federal rights.231  However, in 2002, the 
Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe232 held that the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act was not privately enforceable 
through § 1983.233  The Court in Gonzaga concluded that whether 
individual rights are enforceable through either § 1983 or an implied 
private right of action depends on “whether Congress intended to create 
a federal right.”234  Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent in Gonzaga, 
which was joined by Justice Ginsburg, disagreeing with the majority’s 
premise that enforceable § 1983 rights are as limited as those in an 
implied private right of action.235  Because the Court had held in 
Sandoval that only Congress can create implied rights of action, some 
lower courts have interpreted Gonzaga as foreclosing § 1983 suits to 
enforce Title VI regulations,236 although other lower courts have 
 
837). 
 230 See Black, supra note 2, at 361-62 (arguing that agency interpretations of Title 
VI deserve deference because agencies such as Department of Education possess 
significant experience and expertise in applying statute); Galalis, supra note 43, at 65, 
92-101 (arguing that Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations are entitled to 
deference under Chevron because term “discrimination” in § 602 is ambiguous and 
disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretations of statute); Note, supra 
note 49, at 1781 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to 
question the validity of Title VI’s § 602 disparate impact regulations because they 
deserve deference under Chevron, § 602 is ambiguous, and disparate impact 
regulations are reasonable interpretations and means to effectuate § 601’s 
antidiscrimination requirement). 
 231 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Mank, 
Section 1983, supra note 114, at 348-53, 367-82 (arguing that Title VI disparate impact 
regulations may be enforced through § 1983). 
 232 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 233 Id. at 287-91; see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1450-52. 
 234 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1448-51. 
 235 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 293-303 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Gonzaga, 
supra note 68, at 1453-55, 1457-58. 
 236 See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that § 602 regulations are not enforceable through § 1983 and stating, 
“[w]e believe the Supreme Court’s Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, taken together, 
compel the conclusion we reach today: that agency regulations cannot 
independently create rights enforceable through § 1983”); South Camden Citizens in 
Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 784-90 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
§ 602 regulations are not enforceable through § 1983); see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra 
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disagreed.237  Accordingly, Justice Stevens’ hope that § 1983 suits 
might allow victims of discrimination to enforce § 602 disparate 
impact regulations may be lost. 
Sandoval did not address the disparate impact regulations issued 
by agencies pursuant to § 902 of Title IX.  However, given the 
similarities between § 602 and § 902, it is likely that Sandoval 
forecloses the possibility of a private right of action under § 902 for 
disparate impacts.238  A more difficult question is whether a suit 
alleging retaliation by a school or employer is an intentional 
discrimination claim consistent with § 601 or § 901, or more 
analogous to a disparate impact claim pursuant to § 602 or § 902. 
III.  RETALIATION 
A.  Sullivan and Its Progeny Imply a Private Right of Action Against 
Retaliation 
The Supreme Court has consistently treated retaliation against 
civil rights complainants as a form of intentional discrimination.  The 
Court has held that “retaliation offends the Constitution [because] it 
threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right” and “is thus akin 
to an unconstitutional condition demanded for the receipt of a 
government-provided benefit.”239  Additionally, the Court has 
observed that it will recognize whatever remedies are necessary to 
effectuate a statutory right, because “the existence of a statutory right 
implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies.”240  
Specifically, the Court has interpreted 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983 to 
bar retaliation against complainants or litigants even though these 
 
note 68, at 1467 (“In light of Gonzaga, the argument that regulations alone may 
create rights enforceable through 1983 is probably untenable because a regulation 
alone normally cannot provide ‘clear’ and ‘unambiguous’ evidence that Congress 
intended to establish an individual right.”). 
 237 Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding Title VI 
regulation enforceable through § 1983); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. 
Supp. 2d 33, 47-54 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that properly promulgated regulations 
are enforceable through § 1983, although recognizing First Circuit had never 
decided issue); see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra note 68, at 1467-69. 
 238 See Short, supra note 4, at 133-43 (discussing whether Sandoval forecloses 
possibility of private right of action under § 902). 
 239 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 
71, 81 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing Court’s approach to retaliation in Crawford-El). 
 240 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 69 (1992) (quoting Carey 
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978)); see also Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 81 
(discussing Supreme Court’s Franklin decision as supporting view that courts should 
provide remedies in retaliation cases). 
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statutes do not contain explicit prohibitions against retaliation.241  In 
1969, the Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,242 held that 
§ 1982 implicitly prohibits retaliation.243  Applying similar reasoning, 
the Court in Perry v. Sindermann244 held that the First Amendment 
implicitly prohibits retaliation by the government against a person for 
exercising his constitutional right of free speech, even if the plaintiff 
would otherwise have no right to the benefit at issue, because the 
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
 
 241 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-87 
(1977) (stating that court has jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim that board of 
education violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by discharging him 
for exercise of free speech, even if he does not have tenure, and that plaintiff may 
use § 1983 to enforce alleged constitutional right against retaliation for exercise of 
free speech, but vacating and remanding to allow board of education to prove it 
would have discharged plaintiff for valid reasons, even absent protected conduct by 
teacher); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (determining that First 
Amendment prohibits government from penalizing employee for exercising right of 
free speech even if government could otherwise have denied benefits to plaintiff); 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (concluding that § 1982 
prohibits retaliation even though text of § 1982 does not mention retaliation); see also 
Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (discussing Supreme Court’s Sullivan and Perry 
decisions as supporting view that courts should interpret antidiscrimination statutes 
to imply private right of action against retaliation); infra notes 242-45 and 
accompanying text). 
 242 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
 243 Id.; see also Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (discussing Supreme Court’s 
Sullivan decision as supporting view that courts should interpret antidiscrimination 
statutes to imply private right of action against retaliation). 
 244 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that First Amendment, as made enforceable 
by Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, implicitly prohibits retaliation by 
government to protect rights secured by statute).  Several courts have applied Perry’s 
anti-retaliation principles to, inter alia, § 1983, which protects both individual 
constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights such as those at issue in Perry, 
as well as certain federal statutory rights.  See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 
(determining that plaintiff may use § 1983 to enforce constitutional right against 
retaliation for exercise of free speech); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 
1999) (retaliation claim under, inter alia, § 1983 and First Amendment); ACLU of 
Md. v. Wicomico County, 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Retaliation by a public 
official for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper.”) (citing 
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (stating that alleged First Amendment violation, if proved, would entitle 
plaintiffs to relief under § 1983); Estrada v. Gomez, No. C 96-1490 S1 (PR), 1998 WL 
514068, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 1998) (“Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise 
of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because retaliatory 
actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional rights.”) (citing Perry, 
408 U.S. at 597); Kohl v. Smythe, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (D. Haw. 1998) (citing 
Perry for the principle that retaliation in violation of First Amendment is actionable 
under § 1983); Wimer v. Holzapfel, 868 F. Supp. 844, 849-50 (E.D. Tex. 1994) 
(same); Di Giovanni v. Clyde Park Dist., No. 84 C 4809, 1986 WL 12596, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 3, 1986) (same). 
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infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his 
interest in freedom of speech,” which right against retaliation 
subsequent lower court cases have held enforceable through § 1983.  
Several lower court decisions have read Sullivan and its progeny as 
implying the broader proposition that other antidiscrimination 
statutes should be interpreted to create an “[i]mplicit . . . cause of 
action protecting people from private retaliation for refusing to 
violate other people’s rights under § 1981 or for exercising their own 
§ 1981 rights.”245 
B. Do Title VII’s Express Retaliation Provisions Preclude an Implicit 
Right of Action Under Title VI or Title IX? 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)246 explicitly 
prohibits retaliation against individuals who complain about 
employment discrimination.247  By contrast, neither Title VI nor Title 
IX includes an explicit anti-retaliation provision.  Because Congress 
initially enacted Title VI and Title VII as parts of the same act, some 
courts have suggested or concluded that the absence of an explicit 
anti-retaliation provision in Title VI demonstrates that Congress did 
not intend to protect Title VI complainants from retaliation because 
it knew how to do so by including an explicit right, as it did in Title 
VII.248  Because Title IX was modeled on Title VI and also because 
 
 245 Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to create implied private right of action against 
retaliation); see also Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 324 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that § 1981 “clearly established” anti-retaliation implied right of action for 
purposes of qualified immunity); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 576 
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding, citing Sullivan, that anti-retaliation claim is appropriate 
under § 1981); Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1411-13 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (approving anti-retaliation claim under § 1981); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-
Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff, a white 
attorney, may bring anti-retaliation action under § 1981); Skinner v. Total 
Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding white employee 
could bring an anti-retaliation action under § 1981); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian 
Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1149 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Sullivan in concluding that § 
1981 created implied private right of action against retaliation); Chandamuri v. 
Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that courts 
should generally interpret antidiscrimination statutes to imply private right of action 
against retaliation). 
 246 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-4 (2000). 
 247 The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII states in relevant part that it shall be 
an unlawful employment practice for any employer to retaliate against an employee 
or an applicant for employment “because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this title.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 248 See infra notes 258, 283, 297, 299, 378-79 and accompanying text. 
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Congress sought to address gaps in Title VII when it enacted Title IX, 
the absence of an express anti-retaliation provision in Title IX may 
arguably suggest that Congress did not intend such a right of action 
for victims of retaliation.249  On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
has recently stated that the same term or word may have different 
meanings even within different parts of a complex statute such as 
Title VII,250 and therefore that it is necessary to examine the context 
in which a word is used before assuming that it has the same meaning 
in different parts of the same act.251 
Although a word such as “retaliation” would seem to mean the 
same thing when used in different statutes, because of the differences 
between Title VII and Title VI or Title IX, courts should be cautious 
in drawing parallels between these statutes.252  Despite Title VII’s 
explicit anti-retaliation provision, courts might still be able to 
construe an implied right under Title VI or Title IX because 
recipients of federal aid have voluntarily accepted financial assistance 
in exchange for accepting the conditions of Title VI or Title IX’s 
regulations, including regulations prohibiting retaliation.253  
Additionally, courts have interpreted Title VII itself to include an 
implied right of federal workers to bring an action for retaliation, 
even though the section that covers their employment does not 
include an express provision.254  Thus, even to the extent that courts 
should construe Title VI or Title IX in light of Title VII, there is a 
strong argument in favor of implied rights of action against 
retaliation.255 
C. Title VII’s Mandatory Statutory Scheme Under the Commerce Power Is 
Different from Spending Clause Legislation Such as Title VI or Title 
IX 
To answer whether the courts should look to Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision in interpreting whether Title VI or Title IX 
establishes an implied right of action against retaliation, one must 
first examine the broader relationship between Title VII and Titles VI 
and IX.  Before 1998, courts in Title VI and Title IX cases often relied 
 
 249 See infra notes 258, 283, 297, 299, 378-79 and accompanying text. 
 250 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1245-46 (2004); see also 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997) (stating that term “employee” 
has different meanings in different parts of Title VII). 
 251 General Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1246-47. 
 252 See infra text accompanying notes 253-55, 264-90, 298, 300, 380-82. 
 253 See supra notes 59-60 and infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text. 
 254 See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 384-87and accompanying text. 
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on Title VII decisions in interpreting these somewhat different 
statutes, especially in cases involving employment discrimination 
issues.256  In part, courts in Title VI and Title IX cases examined Title 
VII decisions for guidance, because traditionally there have been 
more Title VII cases and hence more potential decisions addressing 
various procedural or substantive issues.257  In particular, several Title 
VI and Title IX cases involving retaliation claims cited or relied on 
Title VII decisions.258 
However, in 1998, the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District,259 emphasized the significant differences 
between Title VII and Title IX.260  In Gebser, the Court first held that a 
school could be held liable for sexual harassment not directly 
committed by the institution or its officers where it had notice of 
alleged sexual harassment by one student against another, but failed 
to exercise its authority to stop the harassment.261  Because the 
student in Gebser had not informed the school district that she was 
 
 256 Nelson v. Univ. of Maine, 923 F. Supp. 275, 279 (D. Me. 1996) (“Courts 
generally look to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, to supply the legal standards for both 
Title IX discrimination and retaliation claims.”); see also Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 
F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Title VII standards are applicable in 
Title IX employment discrimination cases); Fay, supra note 82, at 1504-05 (“Many 
courts instead looked to Title VII principles in an effort to evaluate Title IX claims of 
sexual harassment within schools.”); see generally Bradford C. Mank, Environmental 
Justice and Title VI: Making Recipient Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 787, 799-809, 815-17 (1999) (discussing similarities and differences between 
Title VI and Title VII) [hereinafter Mank, Recipient Agencies]. 
 257 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“Because the relevant case law under Title IX is relatively sparse, we apply 
Title VII case law by analogy.”); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (stating that court “can draw upon the substantial body of case law 
developed under Title VII to assess the plaintiff’s [Title IX claim]”). 
 258 See, e.g., Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248-50 (2d Cir. 
1995) (discrimination and retaliation claims); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River 
Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1994) (retaliation claim); Nelson, 923 F. 
Supp. 275 (discrimination and retaliation claims). 
 259 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 260 Id. at 283-87 (discussing differences among Title VII, Title VI, and Title IX); 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1345 n.12 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing Gebser); Byrne, supra note 169, at 595, 620-32 (criticizing Gebser for 
refusing to apply Title VII sexual harassment principles to Title IX, but 
acknowledging Gebser will limit use of Title VII analogies in Title IX cases); Julie 
Davis, Assessing Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Harassment in Education, 77 TUL. L. 
REV. 387, 401-08 (2002) (same); Fay, supra note 82, at 1524-28 (agreeing with Gebser’s 
distinction between Title VII and Title IX); Fermeen Fazal, Note, Is Actual Notice an 
Actual Remedy? A Critique of Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 36 
HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1042-43, 1062-90 (1999) (acknowledging that Gebser will limit use 
of Title VII analogies in Title IX cases). 
 261 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288-92; see also Black, supra note 2, at 362. 
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being harassed, the Court concluded that she was not entitled to 
damages from the district.262 
In requiring actual knowledge of discrimination by a recipient,263 
the Gebser Court emphasized that Congress enacted both Title VI and 
Title IX pursuant to its Spending Clause power.264  A Spending Clause 
statute like Title VI or Title IX creates a contract between the 
government and the grant recipient that requires the federal funding 
agency to provide adequate notice to the recipient before 
terminating funding so that the recipient can be given an 
opportunity to comply.265  By contrast, Congress enacted Title VII 
pursuant to its general constitutional authority under the Commerce 
Clause, and, therefore, Title VII applies to all covered employers 
without any need for notice before a plaintiff or government agency 
commences an employment discrimination suit.266  Thus, the Gebser 
Court concluded that a school district must have notice and an 
opportunity to stop the alleged sexual harassment before it may be 
held liable.267  The Supreme Court held that a school district can be 
found liable for sexual harassment by an employee such as a teacher 
or coach only if it is deliberately indifferent after a student or 
someone else notifies it of ongoing sexual harassment.268  This notice 
requirement and “deliberate indifference” standard is far more 
stringent for Title IX plaintiffs than the proof requirements for Title 
VII plaintiffs.269  After Gebser, courts are likely to be more cautious in 
making analogies between Title VII and Titles VI and IX.270 
Some of the distinctions the Gebser Court made between Title VII 
 
 262 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-78, 285; see also Joslin, supra note 112, at 209. 
 263 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
 264 The Spending Clause states in part: “The Congress shall have Power to lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 1; see Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-86; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12; Fay, supra note 
82, at 1491-92 (discussing Gebser’s conclusion that Title IX is different from Title VII 
because former statute is based on Spending Clause); Fazal, supra note 260, at 1042-
43, 1069, 1073-74 (same). 
 265 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-90; Byrne, supra note 169, at 599, 603-04 (discussing 
Gebser’s description of Title IX as based on contract similar to Title VI); Fay, supra 
note 82, at 1491 (same). 
 266 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-90; Fay, supra note 82, at 1491-92. 
 267 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-90. 
 268 Id. at 290. 
 269 See Byrne, supra note 169, at 618-32 (discussing and criticizing Gebser’s use of 
actual notice and deliberate indifference standards because they will make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to sue and arguing that court should have applied Title VII 
standards instead); Fazal, supra note 260, at 1053-71 (same). 
 270 See Byrne, supra note 169, at 595, 620-32; Fay, supra note 82, at 1524-28. 
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and Title IX may help Title VI or Title IX plaintiffs argue that courts 
should recognize a private right of action in cases of retaliation.  For 
example, the Gebser Court observed that the text and structure of 
Title VII are markedly different than the provisions in Title IX.271  
These differences arguably justify a more liberal inference of private 
rights of action under Title VI or Title IX.  For example, Title VII 
contains an express cause of action,272 and explicitly provides for a 
damages remedy,273 but courts have recognized a private right of 
action and remedies against intentional discrimination under both 
Title VI and Title IX despite the absence of any express statutory 
language.274  Thus, the fact that Title VII contains an express anti-
retaliation provision does not necessarily preclude courts from 
enforcing a private right under Title VI and Title IX.  Additionally, 
although Congress enacted Title VI and Title VII in the same Act,275 it 
has subsequently amended Title VII, as well as Titles VI and IX, in 
ways that accentuate their differences.  For instance, when Congress 
enacted Title IX in 1972, Title VII did not provide for recovery of 
monetary damages, but allowed only injunctive and equitable relief.276  
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to provide for a damages 
remedy, but did not similarly amend Title VI or Title IX.277 
In some, but not all respects, Title VI and Title IX are arguably 
broader in coverage than Title VII, as to which Congress has adopted 
a number of limitations.  In a dissenting opinion in Gebser, Justice 
Stevens observed that “the use of passive verbs in Title IX, focusing 
on the victim of the discrimination rather than the particular 
wrongdoer, gives this statute broader coverage than Title VII.”278  
Additionally, there are good policy arguments for interpreting Title 
VII more narrowly than Title VI or Title IX, because Title VII applies 
to a wider range of entities than the latter statutes.  Title VII applies 
 
 271 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-86; Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12; see generally Mank, 
Recipient Agencies, supra note 256, at 799-809, 815-17 (discussing similarities and 
differences between Title VI and Title VII). 
 272 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283. 
 273 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283. 
 274 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 
60, 68-73 (1992) (implying Title IX damages remedy); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 
(finding implied private right of action for Title IX and suggesting similar right of 
action for Title VI). 
 275 See supra text accompanying note 248; infra notes 297, 299, 378-79 and 
accompanying text. 
 276 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285-86 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970), § 
2000e-5(e), (g) (Supp. II 1970)). 
 277 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)). 
 278 Id. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 
128 F.3d 1014, 1047 (7th Cir. 1997) (Rovner, J., dissenting)). 
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to all firms above a certain size in the private labor market.279  By 
contrast, Title VI and Title IX are binding on only those parties who 
voluntarily accept federal aid.280  Perhaps because Title VII is 
mandatory, while Titles VI and IX are voluntary, only Title VII 
explicitly acknowledges that defendants have affirmative defenses 
that may justify disparate impacts, and that employers are not 
required to hire either women or minorities to precisely reflect their 
percentage of the population.281 
D. Title IX’s Anti-Retaliation Provision Differs from Title VII’s 
Because there are significant differences between Titles VI and 
IX and Title VII,282 one must be cautious in applying Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision to either Title VI or Title IX retaliation 
complaints.  Before the Gebser decision in 1998, lower courts had 
divided about whether retaliation allegations by Title VI or Title IX 
plaintiffs should be analyzed under Title VII or under the 
antidiscrimination principles of Title VI or Title IX.283  Several courts 
had applied Title VII principles to Title IX retaliation cases because 
courts had found Title VII to be a useful model in other types of Title 
VI and Title IX cases.284  Those decisions are now questionable. 
Even before the Court decided Gebser, in Lowrey v. Texas A&M 
University System,285 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit had determined that the explicit anti-retaliation provision of 
Title VII was different and separate from the anti-retaliation 
 
 279 See Fisher, supra note 53, at 320; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 256, at 816; 
Watson, supra note 54, at 971-73; Sonn, supra note 55, at 1596; see generally Gebser, 524 
U.S. at 286-87 (discussing difference between Title VII generally applying to all 
employment relationships, if employer is above certain size, and Title IX applying 
only where recipient has voluntarily accepted funds from federal government). 
 280 See supra note 279. 
 281 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000); Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 256, at 
816. 
 282 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-86 (concluding explicit remedies in Title VII are 
different from arguably implicit remedies in Title VI); Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12 
(same); see generally Franklin, 911 F.2d at 622 (rejecting the application of Title VII 
standards to a Title IX claim concluding, “[w]e do not believe applying Title VII to 
Title IX would result in the kind of orderly analysis so necessary in this confusing 
area of law.”), rev’d on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra 
note 258, at 799-809, 815-17 (discussing similarities and differences between Titles VI 
and VII).  But see Nelson, 923 F. Supp. at 279-80 (concluding that retaliation claims 
are similar under Titles VII and IX). 
 283 See Heckman, supra note 7, at 595-610 (discussing Title IX retaliation cases) & 
n.314 (listing Title IX retaliation cases); infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text. 
 284 See supra note 258 and cases cited therein. 
 285 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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principles implicit in Title IX.286  The court first concluded that the 
express anti-retaliation provision in Title VII prohibited retaliation 
against only those individuals who have complained of employment 
discrimination as defined by that statute.287  The Fifth Circuit then 
determined that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision did not preempt 
retaliation claims resulting from complaints about discrimination as 
defined by Title IX, which has a significantly different definition of 
discrimination than Title VII.288  Thus, the plaintiff’s contention that 
she was denied a promotion because she complained that the 
defendant had misallocated resources between male and female 
athletes was within the realm of Title IX’s anti-retaliation provision, 
not Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.289 
Although it concluded that Title IX did not establish a private 
cause of action for employment discrimination,290 the Fifth Circuit 
held that the statute did implicitly authorize a private action for 
retaliation claims under the Department of Education’s Title IX anti-
retaliation regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e).  At the time, in 1997, the 
Fifth Circuit recognized that it was appropriate to infer a private right 
of action from administrative regulations as long as the underlying 
statute itself contained an implied right of action.291  Applying the 
four-part Cort test,292 the Fifth Circuit held that the regulation implied 
a private right of action narrowly tailored to those employees who 
suffer retaliation solely as a result of a Title IX complaint.293  The Fifth 
Circuit remanded the claim to the district court, which subsequently 
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove retaliation.294  The 
Gebser decision’s emphasis on the differences between Titles VII and 
IX supports the reasoning in Lowrey, which treats the two statutes 
differently.  After Sandoval, however, Lowrey’s use of the regulations 
 
 286 Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 249 (“[T]he anti-retaliation provisions of titles VII and IX 
are not identical, and title VII provides no remedy for retaliation against individuals 
who raise charges of noncompliance with the substantive provisions of title IX.”). 
 287 Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247-49. 
 288 Id. at 248-49. 
 289 Id. at 244, 247-49; see also Heckman, supra note 7, at 596-98. 
 290 Id. at 247 (“In Lakoski, we held that title VII provides the exclusive remedy for 
individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally 
funded educational institutions. . . .  Title IX does not afford a private right of action 
for employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational 
institutions.”). 
 291 Id. at 250 n.10. 
 292 See supra note 114. 
 293 Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 250-54. 
 294 See Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 11 F. Supp. 2d 895, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
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alone to establish a private right of action may be untenable.295  
IV.  THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS OVER RETALIATION 
A. The Eleventh Circuit Holds Title IX Does Not Authorize a Private 
Right of Action for Retaliation Claims 
1. Jackson Follows Sandoval’s Textualist Approach 
In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Eleventh Circuit 
interpreted the fact that Congress had expressly prohibited 
retaliation in the text of Title VII, but had not done so in either Title 
VI or Title IX, as an indication that Congress may not have intended 
the term “discrimination” in Title VI or Title IX to include a private 
right of action in cases of retaliation.296  In light of Gebser, the Jackson 
decision acknowledged that there are significant differences between 
Title VII and Title IX: 
We recognize that Title VII is of limited usefulness in interpreting 
Title IX, both because Title VII was enacted pursuant to 
Congress’s Commerce power, while both Title VI and IX were 
enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power, and 
because the text and structure of Title VII are markedly different 
than that of Title IX.297 
Despite these differences, the Eleventh Circuit cautiously 
concluded that “the fact that Congress felt required to prohibit 
retaliation expressly under Title VII may indicate that Congress did 
not intend the concept of ‘discrimination’ in Title IX to be read 
sufficiently broadly to cover retaliation.”298  By using the phrase “may 
indicate,” the Jackson court implicitly acknowledged that the presence 
of an explicit anti-retaliation provision in Title VII does not 
necessarily preclude an inferred right against retaliation under Title 
IX.299 
The Jackson court relied on Sandoval’s textualist approach to 
analyzing private rights of action in deciding whether Title IX implies 
a private right of action against retaliation.300  The Eleventh Circuit 
emphasized the lack of any textual support for such a right of action 
under Title IX.  As the court stated, “[o]ur task, as Sandoval makes 
 
 295 See supra notes 200-04 and infra notes 306-07, 310-11 and accompanying text. 
 296 Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345 n.12. 
 297 Id. (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286). 
 298 Id. (emphasis added). 
 299 See infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text. 
 300 See infra notes 302-03, 322 and accompanying text. 
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clear, is to interpret what Congress actually said, not to guess from 
congressional silence what it might have meant.  The absence of any 
mention of retaliation in Title IX therefore weighs powerfully against 
a finding that Congress intended Title IX to reach retaliatory 
conduct.”301  Applying a textualist approach, the Eleventh Circuit 
determined that “[b]ecause the text thus evinces no concern with 
retaliation, we are not free to imply a private right of action to redress 
it.”302  Yet the Cannon decision had recognized an implied private 
right of action at least for intentional discrimination under both Title 
VI and Title IX.  And more recently, in Gebser and Davis, the Supreme 
Court has recognized a limited right to sue school districts if they are 
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment.303  Thus, the Court has 
sometimes recognized a private right of action despite the absence of 
any textual support.304 
Additionally, following Sandoval’s conclusion that § 602 
regulations do not create a private right of action because they are 
“concerned exclusively with the power of federal agencies to regulate 
recipients of federal funds,” the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 
“[s]ection 902 plainly does not disclose any congressional intent to 
imply a private right of action of any kind, let alone against 
retaliation.”305  According to the Jackson court, the anti-retaliation 
regulations issued pursuant to § 902 could not establish a private 
right of action because “§ 902, like its twin § 602, is devoid of ‘rights-
creating’ language of any kind—whether against gender 
discrimination, retaliation, or any other kind of harm.”306  The focus 
of § 902 is exclusively on the role of federal agencies in enforcing the 
antidiscrimination principles in § 901.307  Furthermore, because 
Congress explicitly established § 902’s administrative enforcement 
mechanism and § 903’s judicial review provisions for recipients, but 
provided no similar express statutory remedies for retaliation victims, 
the Jackson court concluded that it was unlikely that Congress had 
intended to create a private right of action in cases of retaliation 
because “the express provision of one method of enforcing a 
 
 301 Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1344-45. 
 302 Id. at 1346. 
 303 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser, 
524 U.S. at 277, 288-92; see also Black, supra note 2, at 362-63; supra notes 268-69 and 
infra notes 312-14, 405-08 and accompanying text. 
 304 See supra text accompanying notes 128, 274, 300 and infra text accompanying 
notes 388, 405-08. 
 305 Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
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substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude 
others.”308 
Moreover, the Jackson court concluded that the regulation’s 
prohibition against retaliation does not create a private right of 
action because, as Sandoval had determined, “language in a 
regulation . . . may not create a right that Congress has not.”309  From 
Sandoval’s reasoning that only Congress may create a private right of 
action and that an agency may not establish such a right through a 
regulation, the Eleventh Circuit determined that “[b]ecause 
Congress has not created a right through Title IX to redress harms 
resulting from retaliation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) may not be read to 
create one either.”310  However, as discussed below, in two important 
Title IX cases, Gebser311 and Davis,312 the Court did consider agency 
regulations when interpreting Title IX in holding that schools 
receiving federal funds were liable if they were deliberately 
indifferent to student complaints of sexual harassment.313  Even if 
agency regulations may not establish new rights, the Fourth Circuit in 
Peters v. Jenney appropriately observed that agency regulations 
interpreting a statute deserve some deference under Chevron.314 
2. Jackson Holds That Title IX Only Protects Direct 
Victims of Discrimination from Retaliation 
Even if Title IX created a private right of action against 
retaliation, the Jackson court concluded that Title IX only protects 
direct victims of gender discrimination from retaliation, and, 
therefore, does not authorize a private right of action by a person 
who alleges retaliation by his employer because he complained about 
gender discrimination against another.315  Accordingly, the Eleventh 
Circuit determined that the plaintiff, Roderick Jackson, was “not 
within the class meant to be protected by Title IX.”316  The Jackson 
court observed that the text of  § 901 only “identifies victims of 
 
 308 Id. (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 309 Id. at 1346 (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 310 Id. 
 311 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 312 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 313 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-49; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288-92; see also Black, supra 
note 2, at 362-63; supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying 
notes 388, 405-08. 
 314 See Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 315-16, 318-19 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 315 Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1346. 
 316 Id. 
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gender discrimination as the class it aims to benefit.”317  The court 
acknowledged that “[g]ender discrimination affects not only its direct 
victims, but also those who care for, instruct, or are affiliated with 
them—parents, teachers, coaches, friends, significant others, and 
coworkers.”318  Because Congress had not expressly provided to 
protect indirect victims of gender discrimination from retaliation, the 
Jackson court concluded that such indirect victims have no right to 
complain against retaliation.319  The Eleventh Circuit determined that 
“[w]e are not free to extend the scope of Title IX protection beyond 
the boundaries Congress meant to establish, and we thus may not 
read Title IX so broadly as to cover anyone other than direct victims 
of gender discrimination.”320  Relying exclusively on a textualist 
analysis, the court held that there is no private right of action against 
retaliation, especially for a person such as the plaintiff: “[O]ur review 
of both the text and structure of Title IX yields no congressional 
intent to create a cause of action for retaliation, particularly for a 
plaintiff who is not a direct victim of gender discrimination.”321 
Jackson’s limitation of retaliation actions to actual victims of 
discrimination is contrary to Sullivan and its progeny.322  
Furthermore, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects anyone 
who complains of discrimination and not just those who assert that 
they are the victims of discrimination.323  Additionally, several other 
antidiscrimination statutes also protect all persons from retaliation, 
and not just those who are victims of discrimination.324  Although 
 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. at 1346-47. 
 320 Id. at 1347. 
 321 Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1347-48. 
 322 See supra notes 35-36, 239-45 and infra notes 328, 332, 342-45, 347-54, 366-71, 
374-77, 389-93 and accompanying text. 
 323 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (Title VII); Hazel v. U.S. Postmaster 
Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
protects all who complain of discrimination, not just victims); Reply to Brief in 
Opposition, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1672, 
2003 WL 22428037 (S. Ct. July 25, 2003) [hereinafter “Reply Brief”]. 
 324 Some statutes contain anti-retaliation provisions expressly protecting all 
persons from retaliation. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
12203(a), (b) (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
(2000); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2000); see also Reply 
Brief, supra note 323, at 6 n.3.  Several lower court decisions have interpreted the 
anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) 
(2000), to protect all complainants and not just those with a substantive claim.  See, 
e.g., Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); EEOC v. 
Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 
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neither Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,325 the anti-retaliation 
provisions in other antidiscrimination statutes,326 nor Sullivan327 
directly controls the meaning of any similar protections judicially 
implied under Title VI or Title IX, the fact that Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination statutes protect all persons from retaliation 
suggests, but admittedly is not conclusive, that Congress intended 
comparable protections for Title VI or Title IX.328 
B.  Cases Holding There Is a Private Right of Action Under Title VI or 
Title IX for Retaliation 
1. The Fourth Circuit Recognizes a Private Right of 
Action for Retaliation under Title VI and Rejects 
Jackson 
In Peters v. Jenney,329 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the absence of an explicit prohibition against retaliation in Title VI 
does not “lead to an inference that Congress did not mean to 
prohibit retaliation in § 601” because “relevant precedent 
interpreting similarly worded antidiscrimination statutes” construed 
“discrimination” to include “retaliation.”330  The Peters decision 
interpreted the text of Title VI in light of how courts have interpreted 
similar antidiscrimination statutes, especially in Sullivan and its 
progeny.331  Additionally, pursuant to Chevron, the Fourth Circuit 
deferred to agency regulations interpreting the statute as prohibiting 
retaliation.332  In light of Sandoval’s holding that Congress intended 
Title VI to prohibit only intentional discrimination, the Peters decision 
recognized a private cause of action only for those who allege that a 
recipient retaliated against them for complaining about intentional 
discrimination.333  Peters did not recognize a private right of action for 
retaliation on behalf of those complaining that a recipient had 
engaged in practices causing disparate impacts that are forbidden by 
 
881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 6 n.3. 
 325 See supra notes 247-90, 298-300 and infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text. 
 326 See supra notes 239-45 and infra notes 345-54, 368 and accompanying text. 
 327 See supra notes 35-36, 239-45 and accompanying text; infra Parts IV.B & C. 
 328 See Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 6; supra text accompanying notes 254-55, 323-
28; infra text accompanying notes 384-88. 
 329 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 330 Id. at 316-17.  The Fourth Circuit also held that the plaintiff could pursue a 
First Amendment retaliation claim.  Id. at 319-24.  The First Amendment issues are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 331 See id. at 316-19. 
 332 Id. at 315-16, 318-19. 
 333 Id. at 319 & n.11. 
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various agency regulations.334 
Because Sandoval rejected private rights of action to enforce an 
agency’s disparate impact regulations under § 602, the Peters court 
recognized that a key question was whether regulations prohibiting 
retaliation, such as 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), are “an interpretation of § 
601’s core antidiscrimination mandate” or § 602 regulations that go 
beyond § 601.335  The Sandoval Court, acknowledging that the § 602 
regulations would establish a private right of action to the extent that 
they effectuated § 601’s prohibition against intentional 
discrimination, stated that “[w]e do not doubt that regulations 
applying § 601’s ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the 
cause of action to enforce that section.  Such regulations, if valid and 
reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself . . . .”336 
According to the Fourth Circuit, “[i]f § 100.7(e) is an interpretation 
of § 601 that is valid under Chevron, it commands deference and may 
be enforced via an implied private right of action.”337  On the other 
hand, if § 100.7(e) is a § 602 regulation that prohibits non-
intentional conduct, then courts may not allow plaintiffs to file an 
implied private right of action to enforce the regulation.338 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that § 100.7(e) serves § 601’s 
prohibition against intentional discrimination.339  The Peters court 
determined that other decisions interpreting similarly worded 
antidiscrimination statutes had construed “discrimination” to include 
“retaliation.”340  For example, in the 1969 Sullivan decision, the 
Supreme Court determined that § 1982, which grants to all citizens 
the same rights to buy or sell property “as is enjoyed by white 
citizens,” implicitly prohibited retaliation against a white man who 
was expelled from a neighborhood board for attempting to sell 
property to a black man.341  Section 1982 is similar to § 601 in that it 
does not contain an explicit anti-retaliation provision.  The Sullivan 
Court concluded that the white plaintiff who was expelled “for the 
advocacy of [a black man’s] cause” could bring a private right of 
 
 334 Id. 
 335 Peters, 327 F.3d at 316. 
 336 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284. 
 337 Peters, 327 F.3d at 316. 
 338 Id.  In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit stated that “[t]o the extent that [plaintiff] 
cannot show an implied right of action to enforce the retaliation regulations, § 1983 
does not provide [her] with a cause of action.”  Id. n.9. 
 339 Id. at 316-19. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969). 
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action under § 1982.342  The Supreme Court stated that “[i]f that 
sanction, backed by a state court judgment, can be imposed, then 
[the plaintiff] is punished for trying to vindicate the rights of 
minorities protected by § 1982. . . .  [T]here can be no question but 
that [the plaintiff]” may maintain an action under § 1982.343  The 
Fourth Circuit interpreted Sullivan as authorizing courts to read 
antidiscrimination statutes as generally implying a prohibition against 
retaliation on behalf of those who oppose the prohibited 
discrimination.  Additionally, applying Sullivan’s reasoning, the 
Fourth Circuit held that § 1981, which like § 601 prohibits only 
intentional discrimination and does not explicitly prohibit 
retaliation, establishes an implied right of action against retaliation.344 
2. The Fourth Circuit Declines to Limit the Right of 
Action to Direct Victims of Discrimination, Rejecting 
Jackson 
In dissent, Judge Widener agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Jackson.  Judge Widener argued that, even if § 601 
contains an implicit right of action against retaliation, the plaintiff in 
Peters, who was not a direct victim of discrimination, but rather 
reported such discrimination against others, could not file a private 
action because she was not a member of the class for whose benefit 
Congress had enacted § 601.345  The majority disagreed, because 
Sullivan and Fourth Circuit precedent346 had allowed persons who 
were not members of the protected class to file retaliation claims in 
both § 1981 and § 1982 cases if they suffered retaliation for actions 
opposing discrimination prohibited by the statute.347  The Peters court 
cited decisions from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits that had followed 
Sullivan in allowing plaintiffs who are not direct victims of 
discrimination to bring retaliation claims under § 1981.348  In a 
 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. at 237. 
 344 Peters, 327 F.3d at 317 (citing Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 
1144, 1149 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) and Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 576 
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding, based on Sullivan, that retaliation is a viable theory under § 
1981)). 
 345 Id. at 324-26 (Widener, J., dissenting). 
 346 Id. at 317 (citing Fiedler, 631 F.2d at 1149 n.7; Johnson, 215 F.3d at 576 (holding, 
based on Sullivan, that retaliation is a viable theory under § 1981)). 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. at 317-18 (citing Johnson, 215 F.3d at 576 (Sixth Circuit holding that white 
plaintiff allegedly retaliated against for opposing discrimination of others may bring 
suit under § 1981); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 
1989) (ruling that plaintiff, a white attorney, who was allegedly subjected to adverse 
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footnote, the court observed that the Jackson decision had not 
addressed Sullivan and its progeny in deciding that only persons who 
were victims of prohibited discrimination may file retaliation 
claims.349 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that § 601, like § 1981 and § 
1982, did not contain an express provision allowing retaliation 
claims.350  The Sullivan line of cases, however, had allowed implied 
retaliation claims under §§ 1981 and 1982.351  Additionally, agencies 
had interpreted § 601 to prohibit retaliation.352  Under the Chevron 
deference principle and in light of Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that it should defer to the agency regulations interpreting 
§ 601 to prohibit retaliation because they served the statute’s “core 
prohibition” against “intentional racial discrimination,” and 
“[r]etaliation of this sort bears such a symbiotic and inseparable 
relationship to intentional racial discrimination that an agency could 
reasonably conclude that Congress meant to prohibit both, and to 
provide a remedy for victims of either.”353 
One weakness in the Fourth Circuit’s Chevron analysis is the 
distinction between a regulation that merely interprets a statutory 
right and one that creates or “effectuates” rights based on the general 
goals of a statute.354  Although the Supreme Court’s view is not 
completely clear on this point, a narrow view of the Chevron doctrine 
is that the deference principle applies to agency interpretations of 
statutory rights, but arguably not agency regulations that go beyond a 
statute to effectuate the statute’s general goals.355  The Department of 
Education has explicitly stated that the purpose of the anti-retaliation 
regulation is “to effectuate the provisions of Title VI.”356  The Peters 
court, however, appropriately recognized that the anti-retaliation 
 
action because of his representation of black clients, may maintain action under § 
1981 if he can show that he was deprived of an interest protected by § 1981); Skinner 
v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that white 
employee allegedly terminated for assisting a discriminated-against black employee 
could maintain an action under § 1981)). 
 349 Id. at 318 n.10. 
 350 Peters, 327 F.3d at 317-18; see also supra Part III.B and notes 7, 14, 18, 330-31 and 
accompanying text. 
 351 See Peters, 327 F.3d at 317-18; supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 239-45, 328, 
332, 342-45, 347-50, and infra Part IV.B.4 and text accompanying notes 353-54, 374-
77, 389-93. 
 352 Peters, 327 F.3d at 318; see also supra notes 15, 21, 59-60, 289, 291 and infra note 
357 and accompanying text. 
 353 Peters, 327 F.3d at 318-19 (citation omitted). 
 354 See Gorod, supra note 16, at 943 n.30, 945-46 nn.40-42. 
 355 Id. at 946 n.42. 
 356 34 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2004); see also Gorod, supra note 16, at 946 n.42. 
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regulation, at least implicitly, can be used to interpret Title IX.  The 
court was thus ultimately correct that the regulation deserves Chevron 
deference.357 
3. In Light of Sandoval, Peters Limits Retaliation Claims to 
Intentional Discrimination 
Although the plaintiff contended that all retaliation is inherently 
intentional, the Fourth Circuit concluded “that ‘retaliation’ exists 
conceptually only by reference to the acts which form the basis for it.  
Terminating an employee because she opposes practices which have 
nothing to do with Title VI is not Title VI retaliation.”358  In light of 
Sandoval’s holding that there is no implied right of action to enforce 
§ 602’s disparate impact regulations,359 the Peters court concluded that 
Title VI authorizes an implied right of action for retaliation in favor 
of only those who claim they have suffered because they opposed the 
type of intentional discrimination that is at the core of § 601’s 
antidiscrimination purpose.360  After Sandoval, there is no implied 
right of action for those who allege disparate impact discrimination, 
or, by implication, those who are retaliated against for complaining 
of such discrimination.361  The Fourth Circuit stated, “Insofar as they 
forbid retaliation for opposing disparate impact practices not 
actionable under § 601, the regulations may not be enforced either 
via the § 601 private right of action or § 1983.”362 
Because the district court had simply dismissed the plaintiff’s 
retaliation claims without deciding whether the alleged retaliation 
resulted from her opposition to intentional or unintentional 
discrimination, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district 
court for a determination of whether the plaintiff had a valid 
retaliation case.363  The Peters court summarized the standard that the 
district court should apply as requiring the plaintiff to “show that she 
believed, in good faith and with objective reasonableness, that she 
was opposing intentional discrimination of the sort that § 601 
forbids.”364 
 
 357 See Gorod, supra note 16, at 946 n.42. 
 358 Peters, 327 F.3d at 319 n.11. 
 359 See supra text accompanying notes 12, 39, 185, 195-211. 
 360 Peters, 327 F.3d at 319. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id. 
 363 Id. at 319-20, 323-24. 
 364 Id. at 323-24.  The court had earlier explained the standard as follows: 
To make a claim for Title VI retaliation, [plaintiff] must show (1) that 
she engaged in protected activity; (2) that [defendants] took a material 
  
100 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:047 
4. District Court Decisions Agreeing with Peters 
After the Peters decision, federal district court decisions from the 
District of Columbia and the Western District of Kentucky agreed 
with Peters that Sullivan and its progeny were the most relevant and 
appropriate precedent concerning whether § 601 or § 901 prohibits 
retaliation.365  In Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc.,366 the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky observed 
that “both Sullivan and Perry involved antidiscrimination statutes [42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, respectively], written at the same level of 
generality as Title IX.”367  The Galen court concluded that there was 
an implicit right against retaliation in Title IX because such 
protection is necessary to effectuate the statute’s ban on intentional 
discrimination.368  Likewise, in Chandamuri v. Georgetown University,369 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia followed 
Peters and Sullivan in holding that § 601 contains an implied right 
against retaliation.370 
C. Mock v. South Dakota Board of Trustees: The Case Against Peters 
and For Jackson 
In Mock v. South Dakota Board of Regents,371 the United States 
District Court for the District of South Dakota agreed with the 
 
adverse employment action against her, and (3) that a causal 
connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse 
action. . . . As in other civil rights contexts, to show “protected activity,” 
the plaintiff in a Title VI retaliation case need “only . . . prove that he 
opposed an unlawful employment practice which he reasonably 
believed had occurred or was occurring.”  The inquiry is therefore (1) 
whether [plaintiff] “subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed” that the 
district had engaged in a practice violative of § 601, and (2) whether 
this belief “was objectively reasonable in light of the facts,” a standard 
which we will refer to as one of “reasonable belief.”   
Id. at 320 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 365 Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 83 (D.D.C. 2003); 
Johnson v. Galen Health Insts., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679, 695-98 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 366 267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
 367 Galen, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (discussing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
597 (1972)).  Perry involved the First Amendment, but subsequent cases concluded it 
logically applied to § 1983.  See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 368 Galen, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 697.  Because prohibiting retaliation is strongly 
consistent with Title IX’s antidiscrimination purpose, the Galen decision agreed with 
the Fourth Circuit’s Peters decision that the Department of Education’s regulation 
prohibiting retaliation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), deserved deference under Chevron.  
Galen, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 697-98. 
 369 274 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 370 Id. at 83. 
 371 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.S.D. 2003). 
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Eleventh Circuit in Jackson that Title IX does not establish a private 
right of action for retaliatory acts.372  The Mock decision raised four 
difficulties with the reasoning in Peters.  It is useful to examine these 
four arguments to gain a better understanding of whether the Peters 
or Jackson decision makes a stronger case for recognizing or denying 
an implied right of action for retaliation under Title VI or Title IX. 
The first argument in Mock is that when Congress enacted Title 
VI in 1964 it could not have assumed that the courts would find an 
implied private right of action for retaliation because the Sullivan 
case had not yet been decided.  The Mock court argued that “it 
cannot be said that in enacting Title VI, Congress had in mind that 
courts would imply a cause of action for retaliation under Title VI 
based upon the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Sullivan of a 
similarly worded antidiscrimination statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982.”373  
Although it is true that Sullivan had not yet been decided in 1964, the 
Court had recently decided Borak when Congress enacted Title VI.  If 
the contemporary legal context in which Congress enacted a statute 
matters, then that argument strongly cuts in favor of reading implied 
rights of action broadly in statutes enacted from the time of Borak in 
1964 until Cort was decided in 1975.374  Thus, applying a 
contemporary context approach to statutory interpretation, courts 
should liberally construe private rights of action under both Title VI 
and Title IX.375  On the other hand, the Sandoval Court refused to 
apply the contemporary context approach to statutory interpretation 
and instead focused on Title VI’s text in interpreting the statute.376  
Following Sandoval’s textualist reasoning, the fact that Sullivan had 
not yet been decided is less important than the meaning of Title VI’s 
language. 
Applying Justice Scalia’s textualist approach in Sandoval, the key 
issue is whether Title VI’s antidiscrimination language prohibiting 
intentional discrimination reasonably implies a right of action on 
behalf of those who allegedly suffer retaliation because they complain 
about intentional discrimination by a recipient of federal funding.  If 
Title VI’s text supports a private right of action against retaliation, 
then the fact that the Court decided Sullivan after the enactment of 
Title VI is irrelevant.  Under either a contemporary context approach 
to interpretation or a textualist approach, Mock’s first objection, that 
 
 372 Id. at 1020-22. 
 373 Id. at 1020. 
 374 See supra notes 108-12, 127-30, 221-22 and accompanying text. 
 375 See supra notes 108-12, 127-30, 221-22 and accompanying text. 
 376 See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
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Sullivan came after Title VI, is not very persuasive.  Of course, 
Congress did enact Title IX in 1972, three years after the Court 
decided Sullivan.  Therefore, under the Mock court’s reasoning, there 
is a stronger case for implying an anti-retaliation right of action 
under Title IX. 
The second argument in Mock is that the Peters decision failed to 
address the [negative] inference of Congress’ intent that can be 
drawn from Congress’ explicit grant of a cause of action for 
retaliation in Title VII, and Congress’ failure to explicitly grant a 
cause of action for retaliation in Title VI, when both Title VII and 
Title VI were enacted as part of the same act, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.377 
Conversely, the Mock court argued that the Eleventh Circuit in 
Jackson had appropriately drawn a negative inference from the 
absence of explicit anti-retaliation language in Title IX or Title VI, 
despite acknowledging the differences between these statutes and 
Title VII.378 
In light of the Supreme Court’s emphasizing in Gebser that there 
are substantial differences between the “text and structure” of  Title 
VII and Title IX,379 the Eleventh Circuit in Jackson acknowledged that 
the absence of an explicit retaliation provision in Title VI or Title IX 
was not conclusive evidence, but merely “may indicate” that Congress 
did not intend to allow retaliation suits.380  The Mock court’s argument 
that courts should not imply a private right of action in Title VI 
because there is an explicit right of action in Title VII is inconsistent 
with the rationale of Cannon and Guardians, which recognized that 
Title VI, as well as Title IX, created an implied private right of action 
at least for plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination.381  Because 
Cannon and Guardians recognized that an implied right of action was 
appropriate under Title VI and Title IX to enable plaintiffs to 
challenge intentional discrimination,382 it is also appropriate to 
acknowledge a private right of action for plaintiffs alleging 
retaliation, as long as retaliation is considered a type of intentional 
discrimination at the core of the antidiscrimination principles of §§ 
601 and 901. 
 
 377 Mock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1020 (citations omitted). 
 378 Id. 
 379 See supra notes 259-60, 264-77, 282 and accompanying text. 
 380 See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text. 
 381 See supra notes 10, 116, 123-26, 135-39, 141-46, 159, 166, 168-69, 172 and 
accompanying text. 
 382 See supra notes 10, 116, 123-26, 135-39, 141-46, 159, 166, 168-69, 172 and 
accompanying text. 
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Courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit retaliation even 
where it does not expressly do so.  In 1972, Congress amended Title 
VII to include federal employees, but did not expressly incorporate 
the statute’s anti-retaliation provision into its new section.383  
Nevertheless, even without express language, lower courts have 
consistently held that Title VII protects federal workers from 
retaliation.384  Furthermore, courts have interpreted the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act385 to protect federal employees 
from retaliation despite the absence of an express provision.386  
Accordingly, the Mock court’s argument based on Title VII is not 
decisive in light of how courts have sometimes recognized implied 
rights in Title VII despite the absence of explicit statutory language 
and also because the Supreme Court in Gebser treated Title IX, and 
thus implicitly Title VI in some respects, as quite different in this 
regard from Title VII.387 
According to the Mock court, the remaining flaws in the 
reasoning of Peters were, on the one hand, the court’s failure to follow 
the approach for determining implied private rights of action used in 
Sandoval, and, on the other hand, the Peters court’s reliance on the 
outdated Borak analysis applied in Sullivan and its progeny.388  The 
Mock court argued that Sandoval’s intent-based analysis of implied 
rights of action had implicitly rejected Sullivan’s approach, which was 
based on Borak’s out-dated assumption that remedies are implied 
whenever they serve a statute’s purposes.389 
The Peters court had criticized the Jackson court for failing to 
address Sullivan and its progeny.  The Mock court, however, asserted 
that in Jackson the Eleventh Circuit had appropriately discussed the 
Supreme Court’s shift to an almost exclusive focus on whether 
Congress intended to create a private right of action.390  The Mock 
court concluded that Peters had inappropriately relied on Sullivan and 
that the Eleventh Circuit had instead correctly followed Sandoval.391 
 
 383 See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 717, as added Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111 
(1972) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2000)). 
 384 See, e.g., Aronberg v. Walters, 755 F.2d 1114, 1115-16 (4th Cir. 1985); Canino v. 
EEOC, 707 F.2d 468, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1983); Cert. Petition, supra note 3, at 15; see 
also supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 385 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). 
 386 See, e.g., Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 
U.S. 958 (2002); Cert. Petition, supra note 3, at 14. 
 387 See supra text accompanying notes 259-60, 264-77, 282, 380. 
 388 Mock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-91). 
 389 Id. (citations omitted). 
 390 Id. 
 391 Id. at 1020-22. 
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V. CONCLUSION: PETERS’ RELIANCE ON SULLIVAN AND ITS PROGENY IS 
MORE PERSUASIVE THAN JACKSON’S READING OF SANDOVAL’S DICTA 
A. Sandoval Did Not Overrule the Anti-Retaliation Principles in 
Sullivan and Its Progeny 
Contrary to the Mock court’s analysis, the Sullivan decision 
survives Sandoval to the extent that the former case recognizes a 
private right of action for plaintiffs who suffer retaliation for 
protesting intentional discrimination, but not for those who suffer 
retaliation for criticizing disparate impact discrimination.  Even if the 
Sullivan decision was based in part on the now discredited “purposive 
approach” to implied private rights of action of Borak, the core 
principle in Sullivan’s analysis that Congress, when it enacts 
antidiscrimination statutes, generally intends to prohibit retaliation 
against all those who complain about discrimination, remains valid.392  
Hence, the Jackson and Mock decisions erred in reading Sandoval too 
broadly and in reaching the erroneous conclusion that there cannot 
be an implied right to sue for retaliatory conduct. 
In dicta, the Sandoval decision suggested the view that only 
Congress may establish individual rights, and hence, that only explicit 
statutory language can create a private right of action.393  However, 
any implication in Sandoval that only express statutory language may 
establish a private right of action is contrary to the Court’s precedent 
and Sandoval never purported to overrule that precedent.394  The 
Sandoval decision did not reject implied rights of action in all 
circumstances, but held only that Title VI disparate impact 
regulations that exceed § 601’s prohibition against intentional 
discrimination may not establish such a right.395  Even though § 601 
does not explicitly provide for a private right of action, the Sandoval 
decision recognized that, in light of Cannon and Guardians, § 601 
creates an implied right of action for victims of intentional 
discrimination.396  Thus, Sandoval did not hold that a private right of 
action must always be explicit in the text of a statute and implicitly 
acknowledged that the Court would recognize implied rights of 
 
 392 See Reply Brief, supra note 323, at 4. 
 393 See supra notes 30-31, and accompanying text; see also Mank, Gonzaga, supra 
note 68, at 1461. 
 394 See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 31, at 244. 
 395 See Black, supra note 2, at 363 & n.42; supra notes 30-32, 189, 195, 209-14 and 
accompanying text. 
 396 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 
(1985); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11); see also Short, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
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action if there was sufficient evidence in the statute that Congress 
intended to create a private right.397 
B. The Chevron Deference Doctrine Supports Peters 
Pursuant to the Chevron doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Peters 
appropriately deferred to the Department of Education’s anti-
retaliation provision in 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), as an indication of how 
to interpret the statute.398  Agency regulations interpreting a statute 
deserve some Chevron deference, and courts should defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, unless the 
regulations establish new rights not provided by the statute.  Several 
lower court decisions have applied Chevron deference to Title VI and 
Title IX regulations.399  Chevron deference to agency regulations is 
limited, however, if a statute is unambiguous.400  Accordingly, the 
Sandoval decision did not defer to the agency’s § 602 disparate impact 
regulations in interpreting whether Title VI authorizes a private right 
of action because the Court had unambiguously interpreted § 601 to 
prohibit only intentional discrimination.401  Because § 602 regulations 
effectuate the antidiscrimination purposes of § 601, the Sandoval 
Court concluded that the § 602 regulations could not establish a right 
broader than the prohibition in § 601.402  Similarly, Peters recognized 
an implied right against retaliation only for those who suffer 
retaliation because they have challenged intentional discrimination 
prohibited by § 601.403 
 
 397 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-87; see also supra notes 31-34, 212-13, 394-96 and 
accompanying text. 
 398 See supra notes 21, 38, 315, 333, 338-42, 354-58 and accompanying text. 
 399 Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1032-34 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“We are aware of no reported decision addressing the circumstances under 
which a school district’s failure to respond to racial harassment . . . by other students 
constitutes a violation of Title VI.  However, the Department of Education in 1994 
interpreted Title VI as prohibiting student-to-student racial harassment . . . .”); 
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 406 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Although 
[the Department] [of Education] is not a party to this appeal, we must accord its 
interpretation of Title IX appreciable deference [under Chevron].”) (first alteration 
in original); Rowinsky v. Bryan PSD, 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(“[W]hen interpreting title IX, we accord the OCR’s [Office of Civil Rights of the 
Department of Education] interpretations appreciable deference.”); Cohen v. Brown 
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (“We treat [the Department of Education], 
acting through its OCR, as the administrative agency charged with administering 
Title IX.”); see also Black, supra note 2, at 361-62, 377 (discussing Ninth Circuit’s use 
of Chevron doctrine in Monteiro). 
 400 See supra notes 20, 356 and accompanying text. 
 401 See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text. 
 402 See supra notes 195-211 and accompanying text. 
 403 See supra notes 22-23, 334-35, 361-63 and accompanying text. 
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In other cases, the Supreme Court has deferred to Title VI or 
Title IX agency regulations, although without necessarily citing 
Chevron.  For instance, the Gebser Court examined and relied on 
Department of Education regulations mandating that school districts 
should be subject to funding termination only when they have clear 
notice of inappropriate harassing behavior, but fail to take action to 
correct that behavior.404  Similarly, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, the Court positively cited OCR guidelines that notified 
school districts when they could be liable for certain types of 
behavior, including sexual harassment under Title IX.405  The Court 
observed that the OCR guidelines placed school districts on notice 
that they might incur liability if they ignored student-on-student 
harassment.406  Although neither case cited Chevron, both Gebser and 
Davis implied that an agency’s interpretation of Title IX or Title VI 
deserves some deference when defining actionable forms of 
discrimination.407 
C. The Core Antidiscrimination Principles in Both Title VI and Title 
IX Support a Private Right of Action Against Retaliation Based on 
Allegations of Intentional Discrimination 
To effectuate § 601 and § 901’s core prohibitions against 
intentional discrimination, courts should recognize an implied right 
of action for plaintiffs who allege that their employer or school has 
retaliated against them for protesting intentional discrimination.  
Such a right of action is consistent with Congress’ central purpose of 
barring intentional discrimination under both Title VI and Title IX.408  
Accordingly, courts may find that Titles VI and IX implicitly allow 
plaintiffs who complain about intentional discrimination to bring 
retaliation claims because such suits are substantially consistent with 
those statutes’ primary purpose of prohibiting recipients from 
 
 404 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288-92 (“The administrative regulations . . . prohibit[ ] 
commencement of enforcement proceedings until the agency has determined that 
voluntary compliance is unobtainable and the recipient . . . has been notified of its 
failure to comply and of the action to be taken to effect compliance.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Black, supra note 2, at 362; Joslin, supra note 112, 
at 209-10. 
 405 Davis, 526 U.S. at 633, 643-44, 647-48 (citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP’T OF 
EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039-40 (Mar. 
13, 1997)); see also Black, supra note 2, at 362-63. 
 406 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48; see also Black, supra note 2, at 363. 
 407 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 288-92; see also 
Black, supra note 2, at 362-63; Joslin, supra note 112, at 209-10. 
 408 See supra notes 22-23, 334-35, 361-63 and accompanying text. 
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engaging in intentional discrimination.409 
 
 
 409 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23, 32-34, 40-41, 213, 334-45, 354, 361-63, 
393. 
